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Abstract 
Ethnic conflicts that lead to civil wars or other forms of internal turmoil elicit myriad 
forms of military intervention from the global community. Sometimes the United Nations 
decides to deploy peacekeeping troops to a region or authorize individual states to use 
their military resources to quell a conflict. Usually, a state will unilaterally decide to 
launch an intervention before the United Nations makes a decision, a situation that 
generally occurs when the state has a direct interest in the conflict. Although many 
external factors play into these decisions regarding intervention, four internal factors have 
been identified as having a strong influence on these decisions: the failed state status of 
the region in conflict, the duration of the conflict, a request for external help, and whether 
a major world power is already involved. The United Nations is more likely to intervene 
in a critically failed state whose ethnic conflict has been enduring for years, where a state 
will send its military in unilaterally if the conflict is new (months old) and a request for 
military help is made from one of the parties already involved. 
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help from 
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involved 
Major world 
power 
involvement 
Yugoslavia 
(1992) 
“Critical” 
 
Two and a half 
years (Jan 
1990- Sept 
1992) 
No, but 
Milosevic 
accepted UN 
ceasefire in 
Croatia to 
allow 
peacekeeping 
forces to enter 
the country 
No major world 
powers became 
involved before 
the UN 
Darfur (2007) “Critical” 4 years (2003-
2007) 
No No 
Sri Lanka 
(1987) 
“In Danger” 4 months 
(April-July) 
Yes- Tamils 
requested 
assistance from 
India while Sri 
Lanka 
requested 
assistance from 
US, Israel, 
Pakistan. Also 
India invited to 
arbitrate during 
negotiations, 
during which 
IPKF agreed 
upon 
Yes, India 
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(April-August) 
Yes- South 
Ossetians 
requested 
intervention 
from Russia 
Yes, Russian 
Federation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Many individual states and international organizations intervene militarily in 
sovereign state conflicts when ethnic atrocities are present and human rights violations 
are in question. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), created by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, 
outlines acceptable terms of such interventions. Surprisingly, this much-discussed and 
scrutinized principle never addresses the decision-making process that states and 
organizations go through to determine whether military intervention in a sovereign state 
is warranted. Scholars have analyzed external factors that each state or organization 
considers in its decision-making process, but some of the most important factors are 
internal factors specific to the conflict in question, not external ones specific to each party 
considering intervention. These internal factors are equally important causes of 
intervention, and as such, will be addressed in this thesis. 
When a state or organization makes a decision regarding military intervention into 
an ethnic crisis, it usually bases the decision on its willingness and ability to intervene. 
This is determined by factors such as the party’s distance from the conflict, economic 
cost of intervention, resources available (material and military), public perception of 
intervention, and self-interest in the conflict. All of these factors are external and will 
likely be different for each state or organization. They are easy to evaluate on a case-by-
case basis, but do not lead to an understanding of why two parties with different 
perceptions of these factors would both decide to launch a military intervention in a 
crisis.  
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All of these external factors have an impact on whether an individual state will 
engage in a military intervention, either unilaterally or by giving support to the 
intervention of an international organization. Because each of these factors are specific to 
the states considering intervention, not to the crises themselves, different states will have 
different reactions to the same crisis. This makes it difficult to determine whether an 
ethnic crisis will elicit military intervention based solely on an evaluation of external 
factors. Fortunately, there is also a set of criteria connected to the crisis that is 
homogenous for each state: the internal factors. The internal factors that have the biggest 
impact on decisions to intervene are the failed-state status of the state in crisis, the 
duration of the crisis before intervention, whether one of the parties involved in the 
conflict has requested external help, and whether a major world power1 has involved 
itself in the conflict. 
The external factors are all influenced by these internal factors, serving as 
intervening variables rather than independent variables in military intervention decisions. 
Because internal factors are considered along with external factors and sometimes before, 
they are more significant than external factors in the decision-making process. A state 
that is considered critically failed represents a failing of the international community in 
ensuring the safety of the citizens in that state. Therefore the responsibility falls on the 
entire international community to take action, most likely through a United Nations (UN) 
authorization, to assist the citizens within the failed state. A state in danger of failing (the 
                                                
1 “Major world powers” as referred to in this paper include the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, and People’s Republic 
of China) (P5), and “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and People’s Republic of China). 
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level below being critically failed) will not necessarily evoke the same sense of failed 
responsibility in the international community. However, it is likely that a regional 
organization or hegemonic power will have this sense of responsibility to the state in 
danger of failing, which might elicit a military intervention. A state in danger of failing is 
also more of a potential risk for other states in the region rather than for the international 
community as a whole. Any unrest that comes from the almost failed state will first affect 
and possibly spread to other regional states before becoming a burden on the whole 
world.   
The duration of the conflict has a similar effect on intervention decisions. In order 
for the UN to launch a military intervention in the form of peacekeeping or peacemaking 
forces, it must determine that a conflict might warrant an intervention, then send in a fact-
finding mission, analyze the discoveries from this mission, and prepare for deployment of 
troops. This takes a lot of time, whereas a regional organization or individual state can 
decide on its own much quicker to involve itself in a conflict, and generally can raise its 
army quicker than the UN can find willing troops to send in. This is connected to the 
request for help from a party inside the conflict because if the request is made to the UN, 
then it still has to go through this entire process of fact-finding, etc, whereas a request to 
an individual state creates a sense of urgency and camaraderie that must be responded to 
by the requested third party. If a major world power makes the decision to launch a 
military intervention before the UN or another individual state, or the world power is one 
of the original actors in the conflict, other states and organizations will be especially wary 
of infringing on the sovereignty of the world power. So as to not upset the regional or 
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international balance of power or risk destroying any alliances, involvement in a conflict 
by a major world power generally precludes involvement from any other third party 
actors. 
Internal factors are important to consider because they have a significant impact in 
the decision-making process states undergo for military intervention. To focus solely on 
the external factors such as distance from a conflict and domestic support for intervention 
does not capture the entire picture in the decision-making process. While these factors 
have influence over intervention decisions, the internal factors are the ones that make a 
conflict worth considering for intervention in the first place. When the domestic audience 
decides whether to lobby their government to “do something” about a conflict, they 
usually do not consider whether the federal budget deficit can handle another military 
intervention, but instead how atrocious the events in the conflict are. A government 
considers its available resources for intervention with regards specifically to the conflict 
at hand. The internal factors have a direct influence on the willingness and ability of 
states to intervene in a conflict on their own or collectively with other states. To ignore 
the internal factors of a conflict in the decision-making process is to leave out a major 
part and does not give the complete picture in such processes.  
 The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. In chapter two, the literature 
review, the scholarship that discusses these external factors will be analyzed. It is 
important to understand the external factors that influence intervention decisions before 
evaluating the internal factors because both are important in determining when a state or 
organization is likely to intervene militarily in a conflict. The internal factors must be 
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present in order for a state or organization to consider intervention at all. For example, if 
a major power is already involved and no one involved in the conflict requests help, 
indicating that intervention is unwelcome, states will not waste their time considering 
whether or not to send valuable military resources into the conflict. Once certain internal 
factors are present, however, external factors that affect the willingness and ability of a 
state to intervene militarily come into play.  
 Chapter two will further evaluate the differences between military intervention by 
the UN and unilateral intervention undertaken by an individual state or other 
organization. Most scholars acknowledge that the UN, specifically the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), has legitimate authority to sanction a military intervention into a 
humanitarian crisis to stop human rights violations and protect lives. However, the extent 
to which the UNSC should use its power is disputed: some interventions would require 
large amounts of force to be effective, but this would also overstep the boundaries of the 
UN and could threaten its commitment to neutrality. The military and material resources 
necessary for a large display of force by the UN probably would not be available at the 
time of the military intervention either.  
The use of unilateral force in military interventions is also disputed, and will 
further be explored in the Literature Review. It is generally accepted that states are 
allowed to use military force for self-defense against an armed attack, but there is a lack 
of consensus about other situations in which states are permitted to use military force 
against another state, or if another acceptable situation even exists. With the UN having 
limited resources to initiate interventions, it would appear necessary for individual states 
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to also launch interventions, but these particular interventions do not receive unanimous 
approval from the international community. A state’s decision to support a UN 
intervention or militarily intervene on its own is dependent on the internal factors of a 
crisis because states are more likely to intervene at earlier stages and less severe 
situations than when the UN will deploy a peacekeeping force. 
Chapter three lays out the methods used to obtain the information later explored in 
the body chapters. The most significant internal factors that influence intervention 
decisions are thoroughly analyzed to explain why they are important to consider.  The 
case studies that will be used in analyzing these factors are also explained. These include 
UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement in Yugoslavia, UN and 
African Union (AU) involvement in Darfur, the Indian intervention into Sri Lanka, and 
the Russian invasion of Georgia. 
Chapters four and five will provide the in-depth analysis of each internal factor 
identified with regards to the four case studies. Chapter four deals with internal factors 
necessary to elicit intervention from the United Nations. It will explore the theory that a 
highly failed state with a conflict that has endured for years without successful 
intervention is more likely to warrant the deployment of UN troops than other ethnic 
conflicts. The Yugoslav civil war from the early 1990s and the current situation in Darfur 
will be used as case studies for UN intervention. These examples are from two recent 
conflicts, but because they are from two different decades (the 1990s post-Cold War 
period and the 2000s post-9/11 period), they offer the possibility for a comprehensive 
analysis that will help identify the effects of internal factors regardless of when or where 
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a conflict occurs. 
Chapter five examines what internal factors must exist to elicit a unilateral 
military intervention. It evaluates not only which factors are present, but how the 
presence and strength of these are different from factors that elicit a UN intervention. 
Particular attention is given to the international versus regional nature of the conflict in 
question. The UN must work for the global community and be careful not to show a 
strong bias toward or against any parties involved. When a state intervenes unilaterally, 
though, they do not have to be as concerned with state sovereignty or impartiality: in fact, 
it is probably more likely that a state will intervene if it has a bias and a side to support, 
rather than solely to stop atrocities from occurring. The case studies of the Indian 
intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 will be 
used in chapter five. These studies both involve a major power intervening to stop the 
oppression of a group of people. However, they are different when considering most 
external factors that are generally emphasized in military intervention decisions. 
Therefore, these two cases will be optimal for determining important internal factors that 
elicit unilateral interventions. 
In the conclusion, the chapters four and five are analyzed collectively and patterns 
concerning military intervention are established. It establishes that the UN is most likely 
to authorize an intervention in a failed state or after an ethnic conflict has persisted for a 
long time. Further, individual states or organizations are more likely to intervene when 
one party requests help. Ultimately, the conclusion acknowledges that the involvement of 
a major world power in a conflict, whether as an original actor or as the intervening party, 
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serves to preclude other interventions into the conflict. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Recently, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), defined in a report by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, has 
become the principle most often related to military intervention especially concerning 
ethnic crises. The core principles regarding R2P are state sovereignty, including how “the 
protection of [a state’s] people lies with the state itself,” and the international 
responsibility to protect, which supersedes the principle of non-intervention “[when] a 
population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it.”1 The 
report emphasizes that prevention should be the main priority of the international 
community and that military intervention should only be used as a last resort, even after 
an ethnic conflict is occurring. The ICISS recommends diplomacy, political sanctions and 
incentives, economic sanctions, and other nonmilitary means of influence as acceptable 
methods of deterring and stopping an ethnic conflict, all of which should be exhausted 
before starting a military intervention.2 R2P also addresses how states and organizations 
should help once they have gone into a country, and in what ways they can restore peace, 
justice, and a decent standard of living. 
The report strongly recommends the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) be 
the sole body responsible for authorizing military interventions into ethnic conflicts, 
which precludes individual nations from authorizing such operations themselves. This 
recommendation could be a hindrance to necessary military interventions because the 
                                                
1 R2P ICISS Report, 11. 
2 The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Book Review), 159. 
10 
 
UNSC will probably be willing and able to intervene in ethnic crises at different points 
than individual states or other organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). When not approving a necessary intervention into an ethnic crisis could cause 
as much harm as intervening unnecessarily, placing the responsibility of making this 
decision solely on the shoulders of the UNSC could be devastating. 
 
2.1 United Nations Intervention 
Considerably more legitimacy is given to collective interventions by international 
organizations than unilateral interventions by individual states. This norm has applied for 
centuries, with invasions into the Ottoman Empire in 1853 being justified by the 
collective action of the Concert of Europe but not by the unilateral action of Russia.3 
More recently, the need for states to engage in unilateral military interventions to protect 
self-interests and domestic populations has supposedly been removed by the creation of 
the United Nations (UN), specifically the Security Council.4 With the exception of the 
reserved right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack, the UNSC’s power to 
intervene military in crises theoretically supersedes the need for any other state or 
organization to intervene. The UNSC has the responsibility to protect human rights under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, which extends their mandate to launch 
                                                
3 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force” The American Journal of International Law, 67 (1973): 279. 
4 W. Michael Reisman, “Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law,” Yale Journal of 
International Law (1984): 280. 
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interventions and limits the legality of non-authorized unilateral interventions.5  
Given that all responsibility is originally placed on the shoulders of the UNSC 
with regards to humanitarian intervention in ethnic crises, the ICISS uses R2P to outline 
criteria to help guide the UNSC in making decisions regarding intervention. According to 
the ICISS, before the UNSC decides to intervene militarily in an ethnic conflict, a large 
scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing should be present, it should have the “right” 
intention, including support from the victims involved, all other intervention options 
should be exhausted, and proportional means should be used with reasonable prospects of 
success.6 The UNSC should keep these criteria in mind when faced with a military 
intervention decision. However, they are presented as limiting criteria, setting thresholds 
for intervention that disallow military force before these thresholds are reached. If the 
UNSC wants to intervene militarily in a situation that does not yet have a large scale loss 
of life (which also must be defined in each ethnic conflict) or does not receive support 
from the victims in an ethnic conflict for military intervention, the R2P criteria strongly 
recommends that no military action is taken. Not only is this counterintuitive to the idea 
of preemptive prevention, which is also important according to the ICISS, it could easily 
create situations where rapid military intervention is necessary without all factors being 
present, and therefore cause the UNSC not to take timely action.  
Further, setting criteria for non-consensual military intervention under R2P, as the 
ICISS attempted in 2001, will not actually help the UNSC decide when to approve of 
                                                
5 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The Security Council and the Protection of Human Rights (New York: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2002), 3. Bertrand Ramcharan was the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights from 
2003-2004, and served in the UN Secretariat for over 20 years. 
6 Ramcharan, Security Council, 5-6.  
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intervention in internal conflicts, nor will it legitimize the use of unilateral force when the 
UNSC does not sanction military intervention.7 General thresholds for humanitarian 
intervention in ethnic crises were agreed upon by the international community without 
the ICISS report. These include most importantly a manifest failing in a government’s 
responsibility to its citizens, indicated by the government’s being “unable or unwilling” 
to protect and provide for its people. Situations including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansings, are cited as events that would inherently 
warrant non-consensual intervention and do not need additional criteria set for R2P.8  
With the UNSC being the only legitimate body to authorize military intervention 
in the global community, it is crucial that it approve of interventions when necessary. The 
potential for conflict with this concept arises with the use of the veto power by any of the 
permanent five members. An ethnic conflict that should elicit military intervention by the 
UN will be ignored if any of the permanent five (P5) members of the UNSC9 has a vested 
interest in the region and is opposed to military intervention. In these cases, the 
international community should turn to its other options to authorize military 
intervention.10 One suggestion is to have the UN General Assembly hold an Emergency 
Special Session to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping troops. If this does not 
succeed in authorizing an intervention, regional organizations such as the African Union 
(AU) or the European Union (EU) could authorize the deployment of their own 
                                                
7 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 629. 
8 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 615, 619, 623. 
9 The P5 members include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and the 
People’s Republic of China. 
10 Each P5 member has the ability to veto UNSC resolutions unilaterally, causing a resolution to fail even if 
all of the other UNSC members support it. 
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peacekeeping forces.11 Finally, if no international body will collectively authorize an 
intervention, an individual state could unilaterally intervene. 
 
2.2 Unilateral Intervention 
The biggest problem a state will face when launching a unilateral intervention is 
that international law says that it is illegal for a state to launch an offensive military 
intervention into another state. Unilateral force is only legally allowed in self-defense 
against an armed attack;12 unilateral military interventions into domestic humanitarian 
crises are not protected by international law. Usually, when states intervene in ethnic 
crises, they have not been subjected to an armed attack by either party involved in the 
crisis. In fact, states routinely decide to ignore this legal prohibition and intervene in 
sovereign conflicts for many other reasons.  
Myriad scholars have identified various reasons why states would launch 
unilateral military interventions into ethnic crises. 13 Some of the most prominent reasons 
include supporting the right of self-determination of a people, preventing or stopping 
oppression, and exhibiting use of military force as a hegemonic actor in a regional sphere. 
 
2.2.1 Self-determination 
 As the Cold War came to an end, many countries previously controlled by 
Communist regimes were faced with the political choice to continue with their 
                                                
11 Ramcharan, Security Council, 6. 
12 Franck and Rodley, “After Bangladesh,” 276. 
13 Reisman, “Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force,” 281-282. 
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Communist system or choose a new form of government, usually democracy, a choice 
similarly conferred upon many African and Asian nations decades earlier as their 
European colonial rulers granted independence. The people of these formerly Communist 
and colonial nations used self-determination to create their own governments and hold 
elections for their leaders. Self-determination in this manner, where the majority of the 
people in the country choose their type of regime and, if a democracy, elect their leaders 
through secret ballots, is recognized as a fundamental human right in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21 (3)).  It is considered a legitimate form of self-
determination by most countries and as such is supported by the international community. 
 When the right of self-determination in the aforementioned sense is infringed 
upon, individual states take it upon themselves to protect this right as third party actors, 
often through military intervention. The Copenhagen Document, completed on 29 June 
1990 and supported by almost every European country that existed at the time as well as 
the United States and Canada, says that states have a responsibility to defend self-
determination, especially in circumstances where an elected government is prevented 
from taking power or overthrown by violence.14 Taking this stance also helps promote 
stability in the international community. The lack of a legitimate political institution with 
the support of the people in a state will create internal anarchy, which then has the 
potential to spread chaos throughout the region.  
 One of the biggest underlying reasons states unilaterally intervene to protect self-
determination is to promote and support democracies. In fact, the Copenhagen Document 
                                                
14 Malvina Halberstam, “The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy,” Harvard 
International Law Journal 34 (1993): 164. 
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explicitly limits member states to intervening only to support democratically elected 
governments.15 Western nations believe that self-determination can only truly be 
achieved through a democratic government freely elected by the people with secret 
ballots. Governments that come to power through any other means are usually regarded 
as illegitimate by Western states and other world powers. Even China, which is 
considered as having a Communist regime, has leaders that are elected by various 
People’s Congresses, who are elected directly by the electorate, making it a legitimate 
government of the people.16 The nations that are most likely to intervene in favor of self-
determination are the P5 countries, the BRIC countries,17 and other regional powers. 
These countries usually have a vested self-interest to see democracy spread throughout 
the world, whether it is because it will gain them allies of similar values or who are in 
favor of the democratic peace theory.18 Therefore, by supporting the right to self-
determination through democratic elections, states are encouraging the emergence of 
democracies throughout the world, and even regime changes to democracy if necessary. 
States seem especially willing to militarily intervene in a country to prop up a democratic 
government and combat unrest if they can obtain a democratic ally from the intervention. 
 The other form of self-determination is that of minority secession from within the 
borders of a sovereign state. Numerous examples of this have existed since the end of the 
Cold War, including the formation of Palestine from within Israel, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, the formation of Kosovo, the recognition of Taiwanese independence, the 
                                                
15 Halberstam, “Copenhagen Document,” 165. 
16 CIA World Factbook, China: Government. 
17 Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
18 The democratic peace theory states the belief that democracies will not go to war with each other; 
instead, they use economic carrots and sticks, as well as diplomacy, to work through conflicts.  
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attempted breakaway of the Kurds from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, the attempted breakaway 
of Chechnya from Russia, and the attempted formation of a Kashmiri state from Pakistani 
and Indian territory. Minority secession attempts usually result in ethnic conflicts with 
the legitimate government trying to persecute the minority into submission through the 
use of force. These situations of attempted self-determination are often condemned by the 
international community and as such rarely see military intervention from third parties to 
support the people attempting to break away from the sovereign state. The responsibility 
to support self-determination lies only in an international obligation to stop aggression 
against a legitimate government, not to help rebel minorities.19 Legitimate self-
determination allows populations to decide on their own government within their borders, 
not to secede and form new boarders.20 This distinction makes it legal and sometimes 
necessary for individual states to launch military interventions to support the self-
determination of a people who have elected a legitimate government, but not to help a 
minority free itself from the bounds of a sovereign state. Nevertheless, situations do 
occur where an individual state or other third party actor will decide to intervene in an 
ethnic conflict to support the dissenting citizens, such as Russia’s military intervention 
into Georgia in 2008. In these cases, internal factors relating to the third party are 
significant in the intervention decision. 
States that launch unilateral military interventions into ethnic conflicts violate 
international law using the guise of supporting human rights or stopping oppression, 
                                                
19 James Mayall, “Non-Intervention, Self-Determination, and the ‘New World Order,’” International 
Affairs 67 (1991): 426. 
20 James Nafziger, “Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power,” Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 20 (1991): 17, 19. 
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especially when choosing to intervene to help with a secession. When the Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians declared independence from Georgia, the Russian army made its 
way into these territories to support the Russians living there and attempted to help the 
minority group free itself from the sovereign state of Georgia. NATO sent military forces 
and weapons into Kosovo in the late 1990s to support the Albanians living there who 
wanted to be independent from Serbia. These groups had not recently been granted 
freedom from a Communist regime nor independence from a colonizing power; they 
were dissident citizens inside a sovereign territory. The major powers in the area still 
used military intervention in the name of self-determination in these situations. However, 
many other minority groups do not receive third-party intervention to help with secession 
even if they are facing an ethnic crisis as a result. If the major world powers have the 
ability to provide help, as they were in Georgia and Kosovo, there must be varying 
internal factors in these cases different from those cases that fail to elicit unilateral 
military intervention. 
  
2.2.2 Opposing Oppression and Human Rights Violations 
The ICISS report provides states with an option for legal unilateral intervention: 
the need to intervene militarily in a domestic conflict to protect human rights. The 2001 
R2P report gives states the right to intervene in situations with large-scale losses of life, 
and further questions whether states are also given the right to intervene in crises where a 
large-scale loss of life is imminent but has not occurred yet.21 Many states use the 
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humanitarian intervention argument to justify unilateral military intervention because it is 
difficult for other states to condemn action that seeks to aid a suffering or victimized 
population. However, it is difficult to verify when a large-scale loss of life is imminent: 
the question of whether it would have been possible to avoid such a loss of life through 
peaceful negotiations or economic sanctions rather than military force often remains 
unanswered after such interventions.  
It is also almost impossible to verify allegations of human rights violations before 
an intervention occurs.22 This gives states a wide platform for intervention, as they can 
claim the necessity of a humanitarian intervention based on human rights violations in a 
domestic crisis without global verification. Scholars Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. 
Rodley identified that “the international machinery for effectively monitoring claims of 
‘humanitarian’ conditions warranting unilateral intervention did not exist in the 
nineteenth century, does not exist now [1985], and is unlikely to be created within the 
foreseeable future.”23 They remain correct sixteen years later. If a state has a vested 
interest in intervening militarily in a situation, whether to promote regional stability, to 
protect its property and citizens abroad, or to promote self-determination, it is easy to 
justify intervention under the guise of humanitarian aid. This is the rationale most often 
used when intervening in ethnic conflicts. 
 
2.2.3 Hegemonic Force 
 Hegemonies are states or organizations that have clear dominance over a 
                                                
22 Ibid, 303. 
23 Ibid, 282. 
19 
 
geographic region or other area over which they can promote their sphere of influence. 
They often use their power to spread their views and disseminate their values within their 
sphere of influence. The most notable hegemonic states in recent history are from the 
Cold War, when the United States championed the values of Western nations and 
capitalism, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) promoted Communism 
throughout the world. Upon the breakup of the USSR into fifteen separate countries, the 
world lost its balance of power between the two super-powers that had persisted for 
almost 50 years. Since this time, other regional hegemonies have emerged throughout the 
world, including the P5 and BRIC countries, as well as organizations like the AU, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the EU, and NATO. These 
states and organizations work to oversee their respective regions as quasi-police forces, 
as well as continue to spread their own cultures and values. Through military 
interventions and other exhibitions of power, modern hegemonies are able to maintain 
control over their spheres of influence. Using their hegemonic powers, many states will 
militarily intervene in ethnic conflicts in their regions. 
 Hegemonic interventions are characterized by the lack of a mandate to act by the 
UNSC.24 The powers involved ignore the potential illegality and illegitimacy of the 
intervention, instead looking for verification from the international community after the 
intervention when they have finished stabilizing the region and solving the problem.25 
Some scholars claim that hegemonies first seek evidence of probable support from the 
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international community before launching a unilateral military intervention. This is 
contradictory to their intentions because hegemonies are superior powers in their regions, 
with the means to do whatever is necessary to maintain order. If a hegemony had to first 
seek approval or signs of potential approval from the international community, it would 
show an acceptance of the idea that other states are above it, thus no longer making it a 
hegemonic power. For the most part, hegemonic interventions do receive the support of 
the international community because to oppose such an intervention would remove any 
semblance of legitimacy from the operation, increasing the risk of failure for the 
intervention.26 To have a hegemonic intervention fail would pose a greater risk for the 
international community than the unauthorized intervention causes in the first place. 
 In general, hegemonic forces intervene as third parties in ethnic conflicts for three 
reasons: as a result of their sense of duty as the regional police force, to maintain regional 
stability through risk containment, and to support domestic reform in the country facing 
the crisis. Hegemonies generally consider it their obligation to intervene in regional 
conflicts, as they are the super power in the area. For the most part, hegemonies are 
developed nations who see it as their moral duty to help developing nations.27 As the 
“local police force,” hegemonies have the responsibility to maintain order within their 
spheres of influence.28 If it can no longer ensure regional order and stability through 
military interventions, the state or organization will lose its status as a hegemony. This 
makes it imperative that hegemonies intervene in ethnic crises if it seems at all likely the 
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28 Conteh-Morgan, “International Intervention,” 9. 
21 
 
crisis will cause regional problems. Hegemonic military interventions into ethnic crises 
are much more common and likely than interventions by the UNSC. 
Hegemonies also militarily intervene in ethnic crises to contain risks within 
countries facing ethnic crises. It has come to be expected that hegemonies will restore 
peace to regions facing turmoil when the UN fails to act.29 For example, in 1998, NATO 
intervened militarily in Kosovo to prevent spillage of the situation into other NATO 
states, as well as to exercise its hegemonic force in Europe. As Dr. Achilles Skordas 
points out, “states need to affirm their authority and sovereignty by ensuring peace and 
stability through risk prevention; they cannot afford not to act in the face of the escalating 
and destabilizing activities...”30 States and organizations must use their hegemonic power 
to militarily intervene in ethnic conflicts that threaten regional stability, which further 
ensures global stability. 
Finally, hegemonic states and organizations, motivated mainly by self-interest to 
see their values and culture spread, will militarily intervene in ethnic crises to promote 
domestic reform.31 Just as the United States spread capitalism and the USSR spread 
communism during the Cold War as the two world super-powers, current hegemonies 
will disseminate their own views on the states in which they intervene. Internal domestic 
pressure from lobbyists and other organizations in the hegemony will evoke an 
intervention in an ethnic crisis, which then spreads the values of the domestic groups 
through continued support for the intervention.32 After a hegemony creates regional 
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stabilization by using their local police force to stop the ethnic crisis, they can promote 
domestic reform within the country, whether by promoting good human rights practices 
or regime change. Both the use of military power by the hegemony as well as soft power 
through the dissemination of its values will create domestic reform within the country 
facing intervention. 
 
2.3 Non-Intervention 
Many states still opt not to intervene in domestic humanitarian crises. When self-
interests are not involved, states will claim the need to respect the sovereignty of other 
states and stay out of a conflict.33 They can also use the legality argument and announce 
that it is illegal for a third party to intervene in the sovereign affairs of another state 
without the consent of the legitimate reigning government.34 India in particular has 
proven adept at balancing these two viewpoints, of intervening militarily when it is 
beneficial, but claiming sovereignty to keep other states from intervening in its affairs. 
India sent military forces into Bangladesh when it was part of Eastern Pakistan to support 
the right to self-determination by the Bangladeshis in 197935 but is steadfastly opposed to 
international intervention into Kashmir, and would be able to argue for sovereignty in a 
domestic crisis if another state attempted to militarily intervene in the region. States can 
conveniently use the arguments of humanitarian necessity and the right to sovereignty to 
justify intervention or lack of intervention into domestic humanitarian crises. Noting this, 
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Franck and Rodley investigate this concept in depth, but do not address specific factors 
which would cause a state to decide one way or the other. It is well-exhibited in the 
international community that if a state wants to intervene militarily in a domestic 
humanitarian crisis, they will be able to find a justification for doing so, and if a state 
does not want to intervene, they will also be able to find justification for not doing so. 
What is important is not whether a state decides to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, but 
why they decide to, and which factors evoke this unilateral military intervention. 
 Bellamy’s criticisms encourage states to continue to search for a way to determine 
when non-consensual military intervention is legitimized. His strongest point, that setting 
criteria would be useless, is misguided by the previous criteria that have been set and the 
organizations that have attempted to do so. The current thresholds that he adheres to- 
manifest failings of a state government, the inability and lack of willingness to assist 
citizens, and the four concrete situations of genocides, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansings- are too vague to elicit definite and useful responses 
from the international community when military intervention is necessary. If criteria is 
set based on ambiguous concepts that do not address the gravity of a situation but only 
attempt to define a conflict, then Bellamy is correct that the international community will 
fail to agree on when to act. Criteria must be based instead on past actions taken by the 
UN, regional bodies, and individual states. If the international community considers first 
when it has agreed to intervene in the past, it will have a better idea of what situations 
will elicit intervention in the future.
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
 There are four significant internal factors that determine whether a state or 
organization considers launching a military intervention into an ethnic crisis. These 
factors are the failed state status of the country in crisis, the duration of the conflict 
before intervention, whether any of the parties involved has requested external military 
intervention, and whether a major power is already involved. These factors are the most 
important ones to evaluate because they have a significant impact on the severity and 
possible effects of an ethnic conflict. They will be the most telling in whether a crisis is 
severe enough to intervene in at the risk of disrespecting state sovereignty, as well as 
whether that intervention will come from the United Nations (UN), another international 
organization, or an individual state. 
 If a state is considered critically failed or in danger of failing, their government 
has lost the right to sovereignty. The government of a failed or failing state will have 
proven unable to fulfill its responsibility to take care of its citizens whether because of 
human rights violations, corruption, or an unacceptable standard of living. At this point, 
the international community should acknowledge a responsibility to intervene in the state 
to ensure protection of its citizens. When faced with an ethnic crisis, a failed or failing 
state is usually unable to prevent atrocities, which makes it the responsibility of the 
international community to step in. 
 The Fund for Peace organization began analyzing the failed state status of 
individual countries in 2005 and publishes a yearly report in Foreign Policy with this 
information. The organization uses twelve individual indicators to determine its rankings. 
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The indicators are social, including demographic pressures, refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), group grievances, and human flight, economic, which 
encompasses uneven economic development and economic decline, and political, such as 
the delegitimization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, human 
rights violations, breakdown of security apparatuses, rise of factionalized elites, and the 
intervention of other states or external political actors. These indicators are analyzed for 
each state and are then assigned a number from 1 to 10. The numbers are added together 
to produce a final country score, and countries are ranked with the highest score being the 
most failed state and the lowest score being the least failed state. For those crises that 
occurred after 2005, the rankings given by the Fund for Peace are used. For those crises 
that happened before 2005 when the Failed State Index was not yet created, the conflict 
in question is studied with regards to each indicator and ranked from 1 to 10 as the Fund 
for Peace would do. The year used in these analyses is the year in which the crisis 
occurred. 
 The duration of conflict before intervention and number of deaths both indicate 
the severity of the ethic crisis. The longer a crisis has been persisting before external 
military intervention occurs, the more time the UN has to consider and fact-find about the 
situation. It also becomes less likely a state will intervene on its own the more time 
passes. A state with an interest in a conflict will likely begin preparing to intervene with 
its military before the full conflict breaks out. The military intervention will then happen 
soon after by the individual state. Because the UN must take its time to ensure a desire to 
intervene with a military force into a sovereign state, a conflict that has persisted without 
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any other intervention for years is more likely to elicit UN military intervention or none 
at all. 
 The request by a party involved in the ethnic crisis for external military 
intervention gives legitimacy to the intervention and influences the intervening party’s 
decision. A specific request for help is much more likely to elicit an intervention from an 
individual state, specifically a regional power, than the UN. Willingness to intervene is 
often influenced by whether the military presence will be welcome in a conflict. No state 
or organization wants to send troops into a hostile environment where they will be made 
targets, as exhibited by the outcome of UN peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda. However, if 
one of the parties requests external assistance, the intervening party knows they will have 
an ally in the conflict and an excuse if challenged for infringing on sovereignty. 
The final internal factor is whether a major power is already involved in the ethnic 
conflict. If one of the permanent five (P5) members or BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China) has military presence in a conflict, other powers considering 
intervention must carefully consider the strategic consequences of such an action. 
Considerations like this strongly influenced intervention decisions during the Cold War, 
when the United States practiced its policy of Containment and would intervene in 
conflicts in favor of any groups fighting against Communism. Now states must consider 
their bilateral alliances as well as the strength of the major power involved. Intervening 
against a side supported by an ally could ruin an alliance, even if the two powers aren’t at 
war directly. It might also be unwise to intervene at all if the major power involved is 
considerably stronger than the state or organization considering intervention. For 
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example, it is highly unlikely that any other state or organization will become involved in 
the Chechen crisis in southern Russia because the Russian Federation is already heavily 
involved and has significant resources close at hand to handle the situation. The 
involvement of a major power in a crisis has a significant impact on whether a state 
decides to launch a unilateral military intervention, intervene along with an international 
institution, or choose not intervene at all. 
 To determine the threshold necessary for each of these factors, four case studies 
will be analyzed: the Yugoslav Civil War from 1992-1995, the current Sudanese conflict 
in Darfur, the Indian intervention into Sri Lanka in 1987, and the Russian invasion of 
Georgia in 2008. The first two case studies (Yugoslavia and Sudan) exhibit both UN 
peacekeeping and other international organization military intervention. The second two 
case studies are examples of unilateral intervention. Each of the aforementioned internal 
factors will be evaluated with regards to each case study up until the point of external 
military intervention. Many other examples of military intervention into ethnic crises 
exist in recent history. These four were selected because they encompass the end of the 
Cold War era as well as the post- 9/11 world. They are also regionally diverse, providing 
examples from Europe, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. It is possible to take the 
factors included in this paper and apply them to other recent ethnic conflicts to further 
analyze the conditions necessary to elicit military intervention, but these four case studies 
provide a broad sampling so that general conclusions can be more easily validated for a 
wide range of locations and time periods. 
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Chapter 4: United Nations Intervention 
4.1 Introduction 
 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only organization legally 
authorized to launch a military intervention into an ethnic crisis (or any crisis) occurring 
in a sovereign state. While this principle has been violated by multiple states for myriad 
reasons, the UNSC has also invoked this privilege to launch peacekeeping operations into 
states facing genocide and other war crimes, including Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and 
Darfur, Sudan, in the beginning of the new millennium. In general, the UNSC issues 
several resolutions calling for an end to the violence in a conflict, then increases 
sanctions on the country or region committing the atrocities until it is necessary to deploy 
peacekeeping forces. Because of the high amount of cooperation necessary among United 
Nations (UN) member states to agree on a peacekeeping operations mandate, these 
military interventions are typically seen in countries considered failed states and ones 
where conflict has been occurring for at least a year. 
 This chapter will discuss how the UN decides to launch a military intervention 
and what steps must be taken by the UN before they are able to deploy peacekeeping 
forces into an ethnic conflict. Then background will be given on the situation in 
Yugoslavia before the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in September 1992 and on 
the history of Darfur’s crisis before the creation of a hybrid African Union (AU)-UN 
force in 2007. Finally, the four internal factors influencing intervention previously 
discussed are analyzed with respect to Yugoslavia and Darfur to determine which factors 
have the strongest impact on a decision by the UN to launch a military intervention. 
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4.2 An Overview of the UN Process of Intervention 
 The UNSC must go through several steps before issuing a mandate (in the form of 
a resolution) for deployment of peacekeeping troops. First, all parties involved in the 
conflict must give their consent to the presence of peacekeeping forces.1 Not only will 
this ensure that sovereignty is not being infringed upon, but it will also guarantee that 
peacekeeping forces will not be targets of attack once they are deployed. If one party to a 
conflict does not support the presence of peacekeeping forces, the operation might be 
viewed as acting on behalf of the other warring parties, and therefore become legitimate 
targets of war.  
In addition to getting the consent of all parties involved in the conflict, the UNSC 
must assess the feasibility of deploying a mission with regards to funding available, the 
geographic territory of the conflict (terrain, etc), and support for the mission from other 
UN members.2 Once it is determined an operation is possible, the UNSC passes a 
resolution approximately 60 days before the official mandate, threatening the deployment 
of peacekeeping troops unless the conflict subsides.3 Finally, the UNSC will pass a 
resolution describing the mandate of the peacekeeping forces in the region, member 
states will contribute troops and other resources to the mission, and deployment occurs.4 
To issue a mandate for a peacekeeping operation, at least nine members of the Security 
Council must vote in favor of the resolution, including each the veto-holding permanent 
five (P5) member. Traditional peacekeeping missions must be deployable within 30 days 
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of an issued mandate, with complex missions having 90 days to prepare for deployment.5 
 There are many different versions of peacekeeping missions that could be 
deployed and implemented, including military forces, civilian forces, and forces 
specializing in humanitarian assistance. This paper will focus on peacekeeping missions 
with a military element. The UNSC deploys military peacekeeping forces in an ethnic 
conflict for a variety of reasons. The most predominant reason is to maintain a pre-
existing cease fire during peace negotiations, which ensures a secure environment in the 
region for peace implementation.6 The Brahimi Report, which issued a series of 
recommendations for improvements of UN Peacekeeping Operations in 2000, put the 
principle best by saying “there must be peace to keep” in a region before troops can 
maintain it.7 Some highly-militarized peacekeeping forces will work to restore law and 
order in an area, but for the most part, peacekeeping forces are deployed to maintain an 
already present peace, not to make peace between warring factions.  
While in a region, peacekeeping forces are expected to maintain impartiality 
among the parties involved, use appropriate force, show unity among themselves, respect 
international laws, and respect local laws and customs.8 If any of these conditions is 
broken by the peacekeeping troops, the mission risks losing legitimacy both with the 
parties involved and local citizens, as well as with the international community. The 
international community could withdraw its support for the operation, which would be 
especially devastating for the mission if one of the Member States that volunteered 
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military forces withdraws its troops (e.g. the French in Rwanda). If the peacekeepers fail 
to maintain impartiality or show unity against all warring factions in particular, they risk 
becoming military targets themselves, putting the individual people on the ground at risk 
as well as risking failure for the mandate. 
 When a situation calls for military intervention, but the crisis has escalated so 
there is no peace to keep, the UNSC will be reluctant to deploy a peacekeeping operation 
to the area. In these cases, the UNSC can authorize a Coalition of the Willing. Multiple 
states will commit forces to a mission under the leadership of an individual country’s 
army (not the UN). The force has legitimacy because it was authorized by the UNSC, but 
is not directly under the command of the UN.9 This option will ensure the necessary 
resources are available to successfully complete the mission, and also will likely have 
more support from the international community and countries volunteering troops 
because they have more control over the mission. 
 
4.3 Yugoslavia 
 On February 21, 1992, the UNSC passed resolution 743 (1992), which included a 
mandate for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a UN peacekeeping 
mission in Yugoslavia. This came as a result of intense fighting between the Muslim 
Bosnians and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which was comprised of mostly Serbs, 
in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was clear for years that conflict would erupt 
in the region, but instead of taking preemptive action, the UNSC waited until many 
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atrocities had been committed before issuing their mandate and deploying peacekeeping 
forces. 
 
4.3.1 History 
 Throughout the Cold War, Josif Tito ruled communist Yugoslavia in a dictatorial 
manner so that the various ethnicities and nationalities brought together in the six 
republics of Yugoslavia lived harmoniously. Tito recognized the nationalist divisions 
within Yugoslavia and attempted to reconcile them by allowing each republic equal 
representation in the legislature while he controlled the executive branch of the 
government.10 However, when Tito died on May 4, 1980, the system that he had set up 
for his succession fell apart. The presidency was supposed to rotate among the six 
republics, but instead of continued cooperation, fighting broke out among the republics. 
Serbia was the dominant republic in Yugoslavia, and as the Communist system of rule 
was collapsing, it wanted to establish a government where the Serbs had more power.11 
 One of the most forceful leaders of the Serb Communist party, who lead the 
movement to gain power in Yugoslavia, was Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic became the 
head of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986 and rose to become the leader of the Serb 
Republic in May of 1989.12 He constantly made speeches containing strong pro-Serb 
rhetoric that scared citizens in the other republics. On June 28, 1989, he made a 
particularly frightening speech in Kosovo that focused on Serb history, unity, and 
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greatness in Yugoslavia.13 This speech came one year before Serbia held a referendum 
that lead to the decision to maintain a single-party state and reduce the autonomy of the 
two previously autonomous regions in the republic, Kosovo and Vojvodina.14  
 
4.3.2 Slovene and Croatian Secession 
 Tensions began to build in January 1990 when the Yugoslav Communist Party 
split along ethnic lines and violent riots began in Kosovo. Milosevic sent the JNA into the 
region to restore order, which rightfully created fear in the other republics that the JNA 
would be used if they attempted to secede from Yugoslavia and form their own states as 
well.15 Unity within the country further deteriorated as Milosevic increased Serb power in 
the government and continued to change the constitution to have a stronger hold over the 
other republics.16  
Slovenia and Croatia exhibited the first signs of displeasure with this new system 
as they withdrew members from the Yugoslav Communist Party, effectively disbanding 
it.17 This was the first step towards autonomy for these republics. Not only were they 
unhappy with the power Serbia continued to garner in the party, but they also felt their 
economies were stronger than those of the other republics and that they “paid the 
country’s bills.”18 These two republics strongly opposed centralized economic planning 
that was controlled by the Yugoslav government, and felt that they were hindered 
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economically by Yugoslavia’s other four republics. Persuaded by Milosevic’s pro-Serb 
agenda and feeling that it might be dangerous to remain part of the Yugoslav state, 
Slovenia and Croatia each attempted to secede from Yugoslavia in 1990.19,20   
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia held referendums for independence and 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia. This prompted Serbs in the Croatian 
region of Krajina to further announce their autonomy from the Croatian republic.21 These 
Serbs declared that if Croatia could unilaterally withdraw from Yugoslavia, they had the 
right to withdraw from Croatia and remain part of Yugolsavia. The day after the 
referendums, Milosevic sent the JNA (which was 70% Serb) to attack Slovenia and 
Croatia and reclaim Serb-populated territories in these republics, including Krajina.22 
Because there weren’t a significant number of Serbian nationals to protect in Slovenia, 
Milosevic withdrew JNA troops on June 8, and on July 8 the Yugoslav government 
agreed to recognize Slovenia’s independence.23,24 
Milosevic was significantly more concerned with maintaining control over 
Croatia and assisting the Serbs there. In August of 1991, the JNA began an ethnic 
cleansing of Serb-populated regions in Croatia including Krajina and Slavonia.25 Non-
Serbs were either deported or murdered by JNA forces to ensure Serb dominance in these 
regions, making it easier for Yugoslavia to maintain control of these regions. This was 
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the first time the JNA used terror to drive away local populations.26 
As this was occurring, Germany lead the movement in the European Economic 
Community to recognize Slovene and Croat independence.27 This turned the situation 
into an international conflict rather than an internal issue. With this recognition, the JNA 
was no longer dealing with uprisings in its own borders, but instead violating the 
sovereignty and autonomy of Slovenia and Croatia. The UNSC then placed economic 
sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and authorized a peacekeeping mission in Croatia to 
stop JNA oppression.28 In January of 1992, Milosevic accepted the UN ceasefire 
proposition after gaining control of 1/3 of Croatian territory. The peacekeeping forces 
enforced the new borders between the republics. Upon deployment of the UN 
peacekeeping forces to Croatia, Milosevic moved all active JNA forces out of Croatia and 
into Bosnia to wage Serbia’s next war.29 
 
4.3.3 Bosnia 
 In November of 1990, Bosnia attempted to follow in the footsteps of Croatia and 
Slovenia and held free elections with the intention of gaining autonomy and seceding 
from Yugoslavia.30 The elections yielded 86 legislative seats for Bosnian Muslims, 72 
seats for the Bosnian Serbs, and 44 seats for the Bosnian Croats. Tensions quickly rose 
throughout the republic as the three major ethnic groups fought for power, as no ethnic 
group had won a majority of the legislative seats. Bosnian Serbs in particular were 
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unhappy with the distribution of power and opposed secession of Bosnia from 
Yugoslavia. They began declaring regions in the republic with high Serb populations as 
“under Serb control,” and Milosevic moved the JNA into these regions to protect them 
from the Bosnian government.31 Milosevic then declared that if Yugoslavia broke up, 
republic borders would have to be redefined so all Serb nationals were within the 
boundaries of Serbia.32  
 Tensions between the Bosnian Serbs and the rest of the country continued to rise 
throughout the end of 1991 and into 1992. On October 14, 1991, the Bosnian Serbs 
walked out of the Bosnian assembly, and on October 24 they announced their secession 
from Bosnia, much in the same way the Serbs in Kajina seceded from Croatia earlier that 
year.33 On February 28, 1992, Bosnia voted for independence in its own referendum. This 
prompted Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to declare war against Bosnian 
Muslims, specifically those living in the capital Sarajevo.34 Bosnian Serbs used their 
military forces to take control of as much territory in Bosnia as quickly as possible. 
Chetnik gangs used terror around the countryside to force Bosnian Muslims out of their 
villages, again in a similar manner as was used in Croatia to force non-Serbs to leave 
Serb-controlled regions.35 A siege was also placed on Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serbs 
used snipers to kill citizens at random and foster fear among the Bosnian Muslims. 
 As the fighting progressed, twenty thousand Muslim women were raped, many 
Bosnian Muslims underwent forced expulsions, mass murders were committed, and 
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prisoners of war were tortured.36 In May 1992, Serbs placed Muslims and Croats in 
internment camps, including one at Omarska, where “prisoners were beaten, deprived of 
food and water, housed in unspeakable filth, sexually assaulted, tortured, and after 
interrogations, shot to death.”37 These acts constituted genocide, war crimes, and other 
crimes against humanity, all of which are illegal under the Geneva Conventions. Many 
Bosnian Serb military leaders are currently on trial in The Hague at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for these actions. By committing 
these atrocities  with the help of JNA forces sent by Milosevic to “help” national Serbs in 
Bosnia, Serbia came to control 60% of Bosnia, with only a narrow strip of the country 
containing the capital Sarajevo still under control of the Bosnian government.38 Serb 
forces continued with their genocidal tendencies throughout the war and by June 1994, 
over 500,000 non-Serbs had been either deported from or killed in Serb-controlled 
territories. In November 1992 it was reported that there were 1.4 million internally-
displaced persons (IDPs) in Bosnia and 256,000 refugees that had fled to other European 
countries.39 The UN finally deployed peacekeeping forces to the area in September 1992 
with the expansion of UNPROFOR’s mandate into Bosnia. However, only a 
humanitarian force was authorized at the time, with no military force to support the 
operation.40 
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4.4 Darfur 
 The UN decided to deploy UN peacekeeping forces to create the hybrid AU-UN 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as a supplemental force to the AU Mission in Darfur 
which was already present in the region. This deployment in 2007 came after years of 
intense fighting and decades of tension between the oppressed Darfurians and the Arab-
run central government. Not only did the people of Darfur feel politically marginalized 
by their national government, but had also been economically exploited and ethnically 
persecuted since the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1956. 
Resolution 1769 (2007) finally saw the UN taking action in the situation, but it might not 
have been enough, as the region is still embroiled in turmoil more than three years later. 
 
4.4.1 History 
 Darfur has been an oppressed region of Sudan for over a century. In the 1800s, 
Darfur was rich in resources valuable to the central government, so there was a heavy 
extraction of these resources without compensation, in addition to a violent imposition of 
taxes upon the people of Darfur.41 A century later when the United Kingdom was 
preparing Sudan for independence, the Darfurians remained oppressed and 
underrepresented in the country. The British listened mostly to the northern (and 
therefore predominantly Arab) Sudanese citizens due to their higher levels of education 
to determine what would work best for the transfer of power after colonization.42 This, 
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along with logistical changes to official business in the country (such as changing the 
official language from English to Arabic, a language not spoken by many people of 
Darfur) significantly contributed to the Darfurian’s feelings of marginalization in the 
national politics of Sudan.43 
 In the early 1980s, oil was discovered in Darfur, causing the region to be 
exploited for its natural resources again. This oil became important to the Sudanese 
economy as it created many important trading partners including the United States of 
America, Canada, China, Malaysia, and Europe.44 By economically connecting itself with 
major global trading partners, the Sudanese government ensured that outside 
governments would not try to interfere with the internal politics of the country. Regional 
states also used Darfur as a battle ground, with Libya fighting Chad in the region and the 
United States backing the Sudanese government in fighting against both Libya and Chad 
in Darfur.45 The manipulation undertaken by the Sudanese government to ensure the 
support of major world actors sufficed to keep many nations abreast from the Darfur 
crisis for years. It also kept the citizens of Darfur from taking significant action against 
the government to resolve their grievances.  
 In 2000, this mindset changed with the emergence of political leader Hassan 
Turabi, founder of the Popular National Congress. He came onto the Darfur political 
scene to run against current president Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir who has been in 
power since October 16, 1993.46 Turabi came out with the platform of fighting for all the 
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marginalized and oppressed people of Sudan, including the southern Sudanese people and 
the people of Darfur.47 Since Turabi’s emergence, the Sudanese government has been 
cracking down on political dissidents and possible trouble-makers in Darfur because of 
the threat they pose to the central government and possible uprisings they could 
provoke.48 The continued oppression has created an environment of hostility in Darfur 
against the central government, making it unsurprising that violence broke out in 2003 
against the central government. The situation in the region has been getting worse ever 
since. 
 
4.4.2 Recent Emergence of Conflict 
 In March 2003, two Darfur rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) 
and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began attacking government military 
installations in the capital of Darfur, and eventually took control of the capital from the 
local government.49,50,51 This uprising stemmed from multiple sources of oppression and 
marginalization in the region. The SLA and JEM accused the central government of 
oppressing black Africans in Darfur in favor of Arabs.52 Economic issues also came into 
play in the conflict. As water and food sources became scare with famine and drought, 
nomadic tribes began settling down. This took land from farmers in the region, who then 
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had less area to grow their crops, and therefore less crops to sell, resulting in an overall 
loss of income for the farmers.53 As the government ignored the economic issues of the 
people of Darfur caused by the drought and famine, the people became increasingly upset 
until the rebel groups finally took action. 
 The biggest issue the people of Darfur had with the central Sudanese government 
in Khartoum was the feeling of political marginalization due to their differences in 
ethnicity. As previously noted, when the British government was transferring power to 
the Sudanese people at the end of colonialism, they favored the educated Arabs of 
Northern Sudan to the black Africans in Southern Sudan and Darfur. This created 
unequal political power throughout the country and led to an exclusion of the Darfurians 
from the political system. The biggest problem was the insufficient representation of the 
people of Darfur in the central government.54 As the North and the South negotiated new 
power politics to include both regions of the country in the government, the Darfurians 
tried to “demand inclusion in [the] new power-sharing arrangements.”55 However, they 
did not have the bargaining power the South had and were forced to resort to violence to 
express their desires in the country. 
 Once the SLA and JEM attacked the government institutions in Darfur, the 
government mobilized its own militias in response to the attacks.56 Another Arab militia 
rebel force also entered the conflict at this time, the Janjaweed. The Sudanese 
government claims no affiliation with the Janjaweed, but due to the coincidental timing in 
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the government militia’s response and the action of the Janjaweed, many sources claim 
that the rebel fighters are receiving government backing of weapons and money.57 The 
Sudanese government launched aerial bombing campaigns in Darfur to respond to the 
SLA and JEM actions, and at the same time the Janjaweed began their ground attacks.58 
By the end of the first wave of fighting, over 400 villages were destroyed in Darfur and 
thousands of civilians had become refugees.59 
 The conflict in this region has only intensified since 2003, leading up to the 
deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces with UNAMID and also after their 
deployment. The government is helpless to find an agreement to appease both the SLA 
and JEM, and the Janjaweed has strengthened so much in Darfur that the Sudanese 
government can no longer control them either.60 A peace agreement attempt was made in 
May 2006 when the Sudanese government signed the “Darfur Peace Agreement” with the 
SLA.61 This gave the UN peacekeeping force that was deployed a year later a peace 
agreement to attempt to maintain and enforce in the area. However, because the 
agreement was only with the SLA, and not with the JEM and Janjaweed as well, it was 
ineffective. Some world leaders even criticized the signing of the peace agreement at all 
without all warring factions agreeing to it.  
The individual movements in Darfur continue to fight against each other as well 
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as against the Sudanese government.62 Although the SLA and JEM came out in the 
conflict on the same side supporting the citizens of Darfur, the government is finding it 
difficult to negotiate with both groups, as they do not present a united front in terms of 
their missions and goals in the conflict. For example, the SLA strongly supports 
separation of church and state , whereas the JEM is an Islam-backed movement, so they 
are not in favor of separating church and state. 63 In November 2006, six months after the 
peace agreement was signed, Ethiopia hosted more negotiations for Darfur, this time with 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan present, as well as representatives for each of 
the P5 members, Sudan, and other countries in the area ready to commit troops to a joint 
UN-AU peacekeeping operation.64 By this time, it was clear that the Darfur Peace 
Agreement had not created a solution in the region and it was necessary for an 
international force to step in. 
As of September 2005, over 400,000 people had died in Darfur since March 
2003.65 There were 2.7 million IDPs in Sudan, with another 200,000 refugees that had 
spilled over into Chad.66 Although the UN did not label the conflict a genocide, they did 
report war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the murder of civilians and the 
rape of women and children, from all parties.67 Other countries, including the United 
States, have labeled the conflict in Darfur as a genocide. The AU launched its own 
peacekeeping force into the region, but as this appeared to have no effect on the atrocities 
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being committed, the UN launched a peacekeeping force in June 2007 to create a hybrid 
UN-AU force (UNAMID).  
 
4.5 Analysis of Independent Internal Variables 
 It is clear that both the situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and Darfur’s 
state of crisis in 2006 were going to elicit intervention from the UN based on the four 
independent variables indicated as determining factors for intervention in the research 
design. Yugoslavia was a failed state, the conflict had been enduring for years before 
peacekeeping forces entered the situation, no factions explicitly requested the assistance 
of an outside party, and no major powers were involved in the conflict. Darfur was also a 
failed state, had seen escalated conflict for four years, had not requested external help, 
and did not have an effective major world power involved.68 Because of their failed state 
statuses and the durations of the conflicts before intervention, both Yugoslavia and 
Darfur saw UN intervention first instead of intervention from an individual state.  
 
4.5.1 Failed State Status 
 Although the Fund for Peace organization only began assigning failed state 
rankings in 2005, it is possible to determine the failed state status of states before that 
year using the same indicators the current ranking system employs. Based on the Fund 
for Peace’s indicators, Yugoslavia in 1992 would have a score between 90 and 95, 
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making it a “critically failed” state. 
For the indicator “demographic pressures,” Yugoslavia in 1992 would receive a 9 
due to the ethnic divisions and conflicts between the Serbs and other indigenous 
ethnicities such as Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Yugoslavia receives a 10 for the 
indicator regarding refugees and IDPs as there were 1.4 million IDPs in November of 
1992 as a result of terror and violence in the country. There were group grievances, 
indicated by multiple referendums with the intention of seceding from the state of 
Yugoslavia, and then the singling out of the Bosnian Muslims for attack by the JNA, so 
this category gets a 9. Human flight was evident by the 256,000 refugees that fled to 
other European countries, granting this indicator a score of 7.  
There is no obvious evidence of uneven economic development between social 
classes, but Slovenia and Croatia believed there was uneven development among the six 
republic and that they were supporting the rest of the economy of Yugoslavia, which 
gives this indicator a score of 4. There is no evidence of economic decline, so this 
indicator receives a score of 1.  
The indicator concerning the delegitimization of the state was present. The 
widespread loss of popular confidence began with Milosevic’s pro-Serb speeches, which 
other republics deemed as dangerous to their autonomy, sparking referendums for 
secession. In addition, armed insurgencies emerged from within the republics to combat 
the JNA. These two factors combined raise the delegitimization score to a 10. Progressive 
deterioration of public services was also evident, as the government could not protect its 
citizens from violence and terror since it was the group causing the violence and terror, so 
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this indicator is also a 10. Humans rights violations were abundantly evident in 
Yugoslavia at this time, noted by how Milosevic changed the Yugoslav constitution at 
will, indicating a failure of democracy, the abundance of politically inspired violence 
against citizens, the internal use of the military for political reasons, and the general war 
crimes as previously indicated. This indicator receives a 10. The security apparatus score 
is also a 10, as state militias were used against citizens and there was an uprising of force 
against the state security forces. The elites were factionalized as Milosevic promoted 
Serb dominance through his powerful rhetoric and policies, giving this indicator a score 
of 10. Finally, while this does not contribute to the failed state status of Yugoslavia at the 
time of UN considerations for intervention, the fact that the UN ultimately intervened 
indicates external intervention in the conflict, so this indicator receives a 4 before UN 
intervention and an 8 after intervention. 
Analysis of these factors makes it obvious that Yugoslavia had become a failed 
state when the UN authorized UNPROFOR’s intervention in 1992. When it is compared 
to Darfur’s crisis and its failed state ranking of “critical” in 2006 and 2007, it is further 
apparent that Yugoslavia was a critically failed state during its civil war.  
In 2006, the year before the UN created the hybrid UNAMID peacekeeping force, 
Sudan was ranked the most failed state in the world. It’s score of 112.3 secures it a 
ranking as a critically failed state in 2006, and this score rose to 113.7 in 2007 as it 
remained the most failed state in the world. The Fund for Peace scored 11 of the 12 
indicators above 9 in 2006, and even ranked Group Grievance, Delegitimization of the 
State, and Humans Rights indicators as 10s in 2007. The only indicator that received less 
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than a 9 both years was economic decline, which still scored a 7.5 in 2006 and 7.7 in 
2007. Because the entire country is scored as a whole, not individual regions like South 
Sudan or Darfur, the trading partners established by the central government in North 
Sudan probably supported the economy and balanced the economic decline that was 
occurring in the regions of the country in turmoil. 
As failed state, the international community was faced with an obligation to act in 
the cases of both Yugoslavia and Darfur. Under the new doctrine of Responsibility to 
Protect, the international community should have taken preemptive action years before 
the peacekeeping forces were deployed to ensure the conflicts in each country did not 
reach a point where they became critically failed. The indicators of being failed states 
built each year leading up to deployment, and it seems as though it was obvious early in 
the crises that each state would become failed. Because the international community 
stood by and watched each state fall into crisis instead of offering early assistance, the 
UN, which represents the interests of the international community, was obligated in each 
instance to use its resources to ameliorate the crises. 
 
4.5.2 Duration 
Intervention was also obvious in both cases based on the amount of time the 
conflicts endured before anyone took action. Officially, the military phase of ethnic 
conflict in Yugoslavia began in 1990 when Milosevic sent JNA forces into Slovenia and 
Croatia to help Serb nationals secede from their republics. However, tensions were 
clearly rising throughout the 1980s after Tito’s death, and it was as if the world was 
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content to watch the situation escalate without taking the preemptive action so often 
emphasized now with the Responsibility to Protect. In Darfur, a similar situation 
occurred. The government oppressed its citizens in the region since the 1980s and due to 
trade agreements with major economic powers around the world, the situation progressed 
unhindered. In 2003 major conflict broke out, and it took the UN four years before 
deploying peacekeeping forces to the region. 
The official duration of Yugoslavia’s military conflict before UN intervention was 
two and a half years, from January 1990 to September 1992. In the years preceding this, 
multiple events occurred in Yugoslavia that created political instability throughout the 
country. Although Tito had left a plan in place for leadership in the country after his 
death, he did not realize that his strict ruling force was what was keeping the six republics 
under control, and that a rotating presidency would not ensure continued peace. Serbia’s 
determination to gain power, lead in full force by Milosevic and his nationalist rhetoric, 
scared the other republics into secession. It is likely that the revolutions away from 
Communism throughout the rest of Europe in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, and East Germany also influenced Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in their 
decisions to secede from Yugoslavia. The face of all of Eastern Europe was changing in 
the late 1980s, so it seemed reasonable that Yugoslavia was going through its own 
dissolution. The rest of Eastern Europe discovered how to peacefully leave the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and move to capitalism, whereas Milosevic was not 
yet ready to let go of his country. The duration of the conflict allowed the UN to monitor 
the situation for a few years and take the time to launch exploratory missions before 
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determining peacekeeping forces were necessary. If another individual state were to have 
intervened, the UN might not have found it important to gather their own resources for 
intervention. No state was willing to place the entire burden of intervention on their own 
military, so it was up to the UN. 
 The same situation occurred in Darfur, where no individual state wanted to 
interfere in the conflict and it was left up to the UN and the AU to take collective action 
after many years. Although the people of Darfur had been oppressed for centuries, the 
emergence of political leader Hassan Turabi sparked turmoil in 2003. The SLA and JEM 
took matters into their own hands by attacking the government institutions and fighting 
among the rebel groups, the Arab government forces, and the Janjaweed. The situation 
continued to escalate until 2005 when the AU attempted to solve the crisis by sending in 
its own peacekeeping force. Unfortunately, this military force had no effect on the 
severity of the conflict. The murder and rape of civilians and the ravaging of villages 
caused the death toll to rise, as well as the number of IDPs and refugees in Chad. It took 
the UN four years of watching these atrocities occur and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) like Save Darfur lobbying before they took action. Although citizens in many 
countries including the United States attempted to raise awareness of the situation in their 
governments with public campaigns and peaceful protests, no individual state wanted to 
take on the responsibility for the crisis in Darfur. 
 
4.5.3 Request for External Help 
Another state might also have intervened if any of the involved parties had 
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requested backup or additional military forces. In Yugoslavia, the JNA was powerful 
enough that it did not need to call in reinforcements, and the other parties did not have 
alliances with powerful military states from whom they could have requested help. In 
Darfur, a similar scenario took place. The government militia and the Janjaweed were in 
complete control of the region so they did not need to ask for help from outside parties. 
The people of Darfur were not powerful enough to ask for help from anyone who would 
be able to come to their rescue. The parties involved in these conflicts either didn’t need 
to ask for help or were unable to. If they had, a third party might have intervened before 
the UN, but this was not the case. 
There are further possible explanations for why Croatia and Bosnia did not 
attempt to enlist outside forces in fighting against the JNA. Both countries were 
attempting to become autonomous and independent nations, and immediately relying on 
the military forces of other states might have made they seem unworthy of independence 
and as though they could not provide security for their citizens. The countries might have 
also been trying to prove their worthiness of autonomy as the other Communist states had 
when they broke away from the USSR without additional help. Finally, because the rest 
of Europe was still in an uneasy transition from the Cold War during the Yugoslav civil 
war, Croatia and Bosnia might not have known who they could turn to for military 
assistance against the JNA. Ultimately, Milosevic accepted a UN intervention in the form 
of a peacekeeping mission by agreeing to the ceasefire with Croatia so that peacekeeping 
forces could be deployed. He did not specifically request these forces, though, so it 
remains that no parties in the conflict requested outside help. This seems to account for 
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why no individual states felt the need to unilaterally intervene in the conflict. 
This is probably also the case in Darfur. The government was strong enough not 
to have to request help, and by the time Darfurians realized they required additional 
forces, there was no cohesive unit to request the help from outside parties. In addition, the 
Darfurians were not the initial victims of the attack: instead the SLA and JEM had taken 
the initiative to attack the government institutions. This presented them in a less-than-
favorable light to the rest of the world and it probably would have been difficult at first to 
convince outside military forces to come to their rescue. Essentially, they started this 
conflict themselves and they would have to solve it on their own. Once the conflict 
progressed and it was clear that the government and Janjaweed were committing war 
crimes against the helpless Darfurians, organizations around the world began to lobby for 
intervention in Darfur, which eventually lead to the AU and UN involvement. Before the 
lobbyists got involved however, it would have been difficult to find support for the 
people of Darfur who had taken up arms against their own government. 
Although external help would have been welcome and helpful in both Yugoslavia 
for the Croats and Bosnians, and in Darfur, the aggressive powers were strong enough to 
not need to ask for help, and the helpless citizens who were being attacked did not have 
the means or global reputation to request additional military help. Had a major or 
regional power been requested to send in military, they probably would have knowing 
they would have an ally in the conflict. This did not happen in either situation though, 
leaving the UN to deploy their own troops. 
 
52 
 
4.5.4 Major World Power Involvement 
It is fairly obvious that since no states intervened unilaterally in the conflicts, 
there were no major world powers involved before UN intervention. Regional powers 
would have been more inclined to intervene in each situation (and in fact did eventually, 
with NATO assisting UN forces in Yugoslavia and the AU attempting to bring peace in 
Darfur). For a major world power to intervene in an ethnic conflict, it would either have 
to be regionally advantageous for themselves, or for there to be some other self-
motivation for the world power. There were no major world powers (as previously 
defined in the introduction) in the region with Darfur, and although Yugoslavia was near 
Russia and France, there was no benefit to either of these countries that would come from 
intervening with their military. 
The only major world powers that would have even considered intervention in 
Yugoslavia would have been the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Russia. 
The United States and Russia were still both interested in the possibility of a global 
transition from Communism to capitalism, but during the 1980s Gorbachev was highly in 
favor of his program of Perestroika and having each country find Communism in their 
own way, so he would have wanted Yugoslavia to work out its own internal issues rather 
than interfere with military force. Additionally, the USSR and Tito’s Yugoslavia were 
never allied with each other, as Tito refused to submit to the USSR as a Communist 
hegemony, so Russia was not entirely concerned with what was occurring in Yugoslavia. 
By the time Yeltsin took office in 1991, he was in favor of capitalism and democracy, 
and intervening in Yugoslavia to maintain peace would probably have further promoted 
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Communism in the country.  
The United States had just seen other Communist regimes in Europe collapse on 
their own and reemerge as capitalist nations, and there was no reason to think this 
wouldn’t happen in Yugoslavia as well. In addition, the Americans were already heavily 
involved in the Middle East with the Gulf War in Kuwait, and were focusing most of 
their resources on this conflict. The United Kingdom and France were not individually 
concerned with the Yugoslav conflict (Germany seemed to be the most involved in the 
matter, as it lead the way for recognition of an independent Croatia by the European 
Economic Community). Collectively, the United States, United Kingdom, and France 
joined with the rest of NATO to launch a support mission for the UN peacekeeping 
forces in the late 1990s.  This was only after the UN had made the initial effort though. 
 It is difficult to imagine any major world power seeing any self-benefits from 
intervening in Darfur. None of the major world powers are located regionally near Sudan, 
so the effects of the war would be unlikely to directly affect their land or people. Only 
2% of Sudan’s population is foreign, so there are not high diaspora populations that 
would need protection. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the Sudanese government 
had signed trade agreements with multiple major powers including the United States and 
China regarding oil, a highly prized commodity in today’s global economy. If either of 
these major world powers or any others had intervened to assist the SLA or JEM they 
would have faced repercussions from trade with the Sudanese government and probably 
lost some of their oil imports.   
 As the major world powers were content to remain impartial and uninvolved in 
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Yugoslavia and Darfur, it was clear the UN would have to get involved eventually. There 
was no reason for major powers to involve themselves in either of the conflicts, and it 
would have been potentially economically harmful to get involved unilaterally in Darfur. 
Further, no major world powers would have had reason to become involved on their own 
on either side of the conflicts. The United States was probably hoping Yugoslavia would 
become capitalist of its own accord. Yeltsin was dealing with the breakup of the USSR at 
the time and had no time to deal with Yugoslavia. The Darfur issue was a regional 
problem where the Darfurians wanted to have a larger say in their government. They 
were not trying to break away from Sudan or overthrow the government, so it was a truly 
internal issue in the country. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In both cases, UN intervention was the most likely military intervention outcome. 
Yugoslavia was a failed state, which indicated a failing of the international community 
and therefore a responsibility to help fix the situation. The conflict had endured long 
enough that it was evident no other forces were going to intervene, and the UN had 
enough time to gather its resources and launch peacekeeping forces. No outside help was 
requested from individual states, and it was unlikely to be given by a major power that 
could make a difference anyway.  
The Darfur situation occurred in the most failed state in the world at the time 
according to the Fund for Peace organization. Tensions were clearly rising for years, and 
the southern area of the country had already been in conflict with the government, it was 
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only a matter of time before Darfur also engaged in conflict. Once they did, the conflict 
persisted for four years before the UN sent in forces to form the hybrid AU-UN 
peacekeeping force, UNAMID. The warring factions either didn’t have the need or the 
ability to request help from outside forces, and the major world powers had no reason to 
voluntarily become involved in the conflict.  All signs in each of these ethnic conflicts 
pointed to the UN having to intervene with its peacekeeping forces to resolve the issues.  
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Chapter 5: Unilateral Military Interventions 
5.1 Introduction 
When the United Nations (UN) is unable or unwilling to become involved in a 
conflict with peacekeeping troops, an individual state might take the burden upon itself to 
send in its military.  This could be done for myriad reasons, the most common being an 
affiliation with one of the parties involved, fear of the conflict spilling into its own 
territory, protection of nationals, expats, or a diaspora population, or a request from one 
of the parties involved in the conflict.   
There is no official doctrine dictating how individual states make this decision as 
there is with the UN decision to deploy peacekeeping forces. There is, however, a pattern 
of steps states usually go through before sending in military forces. In the case studies 
analyzed in this chapter, which are the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the 
Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, both India and Russia showed dispositions 
toward one of the parties involved in the dispute early on in the conflict. As the situation 
progressed, India encouraged negotiations and steps toward peace in Sri Lanka, while 
Russia brought the Georgian conflict to the UN’s attention so as to foster concern and 
obtain the unofficial support of the international community to take action with regards to 
the situation.  
While it is possible and even likely that these patterns apply only when a major 
world power is making an intervention decision regarding a neighboring state, they are 
reasonable and perhaps necessary steps to take before deploying a military force to a 
region. The Indian intervention into Sri Lankan is analyzed as an example of a regional 
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threat to peace, as it was expected that Tamils in southern India would begin to riot if the 
Indian government did not assist the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Russian intervention into 
Georgia was selected for analysis as an example of providing assistance to a diaspora 
population that requested military assistance from an individual state. These examples 
differ in their approaches to the intervention, but complement each other because they are 
both regional conflicts with a rebel force rising up against the sovereign government in an 
attempt to secede and create an independent state. 
 
5.2 Indian Invasion of Sri Lanka 
 Independence from colonizing European countries created many conflicts around 
the world between the indigenous peoples, especially in South Asia. When India and Sri 
Lanka received their independence from the United Kingdom after World War II, ethnic 
conflicts that had been suppressed by the colonizers broke out among warring factions, 
most notably the ruling Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The conflict continued to 
escalate in Sri Lanka until the 1980s when violent riots began and military force was used 
by the Sri Lankan government against its own people to quell the riots. India’s decision to 
intervene with its military in this conflict was made for both domestic reasons and issues 
relating to the internal factors of the conflict itself. One of the biggest deciding factors 
was the invitation for military intervention in the form of peacekeeping from the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord of 1987. Also, although the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils in 
Sri Lanka had been forming since independence, the situation in the Jaffna Peninsula in 
the north of the country that India was ultimately concerned with formed less than a year 
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before the Indian military entered the country. It appears that the internal request for help 
and short time of conflict before intervention contributed largely to unilateral military 
intervention decisions. 
  
5.2.1 Notions of Civil War in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka received its independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 along with 
India. Immediately, Tamil plantation owners were singled-out by the other Sri Lankans as 
having loyalties to India, possibly because of the large Tamil population in Southern 
India which borders Sri Lanka.1 The Tamils were further ostracized by the rest of the 
island as Sri Lanka became dominated by Sinhala-Buddhists and Sinhalese was made the 
official language.2 The Sinhalese considered themselves the ethnic majority in the 
country and ignored all ethnic minorities in constitutional independence agreements. The 
army, police, and other security forces, as well as the state bureaucracy and other 
government institutions became ethnic-based with a large Sinhalese presence.3 Finally, in 
1975, Tamil political activists decided that only the creation of their own independent 
state would be sufficient to satisfy their desires and stop the oppression they faced from 
the Sinhalese.4 
 In the early 1980s India introduced the “India Doctrine” to South Asia. Based on 
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the American Monroe Doctrine of 1832, India declared that it wouldn’t tolerate external 
intervention in South Asia if it was done with an anti-Indian intentions. The doctrine also 
said that no government in South Asia should request military assistance from an anti-
Indian third party. Therefore, India expected that it would be included in any requests for 
military intervention or other forms of assistance in South Asia. Failure to do so would be 
considered anti-Indian by the Indian government.5 India wanted to ensure that it was 
included in the politics of South Asia during its development and became a hegemony in 
the region with this doctrine. The implication of the India Doctrine was that if any state in 
South Asia engaged in anti-Indian activities, India would use that as a basis for 
legitimizing military intervention. When the Sri Lankan government promoted pro-
American policies, India viewed this as anti-Indian, which led them to support the Tamils 
against Sri Lanka in their fight for independence.6 
 The tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils broke out in violence in July 1983 
when anti-Tamil ethnic riots began. As the fighting escalated, India covertly began 
training the Tamil Militants to resist the Sri Lankan forces.7 Although this is officially 
denied by the Indian government, there is evidence that the Indian Research and Analysis 
Wing (RAW) supported the Tamil rebel groups through guerilla training to oppose the 
Sri Lankan government, although it did not want any one rebel group to have complete 
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control in Sri Lanka.8 The rebel group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
recognized that while India was providing support and weaponry to the Tamil rebel 
groups, it did not ultimately want to hand over full control to the groups. Therefore, 
LTTE also began to stockpile its own weapons and funds, which allowed it to continue 
fighting when India pulled its funding to the Tamil rebels.9 The strengthened LTTE grew 
to become the main fighting faction against the Sri Lankan government through India’s 
removal of support for the other groups. 
 The increase in fighting led to the first round of peace talks between the Sri 
Lankan government and Tamil rebels, which was held in Bhutan’s capital, Thimpu, in 
August 1984.10 Indian attempted to arbitrate the talks, but neither party was willing to 
compromise, making the negotiations ineffective. Instead, both sides walked away from 
the talks ready to fight harder for their cause. The talks that were supposed to bring peace 
to the island instead hardened both sides so that when fighting resumed, the Sri Lankan 
government fought harder against the LTTE and other Tamil rebel groups than it had in 
previous years. The situation intensified until India was forced to step in again and try to 
ameliorate the problem in 1987. 
 
5.2.2 Events Leading up to Intervention 
 By 1986, most of the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka was under control of 
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the LTTE rebels.11 Several things were made clear at this point: that LTTE was ready to 
fight to the finish to defend the Tamils’ desire for an independent state, that Sri Lanka 
was preparing to attack the peninsula, and that Indian forces would likely launch a 
counter attack if this occurred.12 In April of 1987, India began planning an intervention 
into the Jaffna peninsula in case Sri Lanka decided to attack the region. The Indian 
government realized that if Sri Lanka used its military to solve the ethnic conflict the 
Tamils in Southern India would expect their government to intervene, and India could 
face its own internal crisis if it stayed neutral in the conflict. Further, because of the 
proximity of the Jaffna peninsula to India, a refugee situation would certainly be created. 
Finally, Sri Lankan requests for military assistance from the United States, Israel, and 
Pakistan threatened Indian security in the region.13 India’s preemptive preparations for 
intervention came to fruition when Sri Lanka launched “Operation Liberation” in May 
1987 in an attempt to reclaim the Jaffna peninsula from the Tamil rebels.14 
 In response to Operation Liberation, India launched “Operation Poomaalai,” in 
which it violated Sri Lanka’s air space to drop food and medicine to the civilians of the 
Jaffna peninsula.15 By not launching an offensive military action as would have been 
expected after the military preparations, India exhibited its continual hope for peace in 
the region. It promoted the need for negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and 
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Tamil rebels and hoped for a peaceful solution to the situation. Nevertheless, the Indian 
government continued to hold military exercises in the event that an offensive military 
movement into the peninsula was necessary, which seemed likely.16 RAW reported that 
LTTE would not be able to hold the Jaffna peninsula against an attack by the Sri Lankan 
Army (SLA), and further reported that if SLA captured the peninsula, India would face 
its own uprisings by Tamils in the southern part of their country.17 With the SLA gaining 
ground in the Jaffna peninsula, India was aware that it would either have to ensure 
successful completion of negotiations between the Tamil rebels and Sri Lanka, or prepare 
to launch a military intervention onto the island. 
 On July 29, 1987, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed.18 In the accord, the Sri 
Lankan government agreed to a devolution of power in exchange for a laying down of 
arms by the Tamil militants.19 The SLA agreed to withdraw to its own camps in the 
Tamil region while the Tamil rebel groups surrendered to the Indian peacekeeping forces 
(IPKF) that were deployed to the region almost immediately after the signing of the 
Accord.20 It also required the militants to rejoin mainstream politics in the country.21 This 
agreement was signed by Sri Lanka and all Tamil rebels at the time except the LTTE. 
Because of the strength the LTTE had gained during recent years, it did not need to agree 
to the terms of the Accord, and therefore did not lay down its arms to stop fighting.22 In 
October 1987, war broke out between the IPKF and the LTTE. As the LTTE gained 
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ground, the IPKF, who were expecting to perform only peacekeeping operations and 
were not prepared for a defensive military battle against the Tamils, fell apart and left the 
island.23 India’s military intervention into Sri Lanka was determined to be a failure. 
 
5.3 Russian Invasion of Georgia 
 Although the actual conflict in Georgia lasted only five days in August 2008, 
events that began with the breakup of the Soviet Union put this conflict in motion. The 
separatist attitude from the early 1990s carried over in Georgia through the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 up to the attempted separations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
Georgia in 2008. Russia then intervened with its military to assist the breakaway 
republics and fight back the Georgian forces. Though Russia went to the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) at first with draft resolutions condemning the violence, it 
ultimately did not wait for the UNSC to investigate the situation before taking matters 
into its own hands. Russia launched a military intervention to come to the aid of the 
ethnic minorities and Russian nationals in the region who were being oppressed and 
attacked by the Georgian government. 
 
5.3.1 Independence from the Soviet Union 
 Georgia began launching demonstrations for independence from the Soviet Union 
in 1988 while many other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were collapsing.24 
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These demonstrations were bolstered by Gorbachev’s new policies in the Soviet Union of 
Glasnost and Perestroika, which included freedom of information regarding Soviet 
government activities and increased independence for political and economic 
institutions.25 By following these policies, Gorbachev let people in the Soviet republics 
express their own ideas about how the government and country should be run. The 
citizens of Georgia thought the best way for their country to be run would be with 
independence and autonomy from the Soviet Union. Throughout the country, expressing 
a desire for independence was encouraged. In October of 1990, the first multiparty 
elections were held in Georgia on a national level.  However, regional and ethnic-based 
parties were excluded from the elections to maintain a national sentiment, effectively 
eliminating parties that supported minority rights from running in the elections. Some 
parties and other groups in Georgia did not recognize the results of the election because 
at this time, Georgia was still part of the Soviet Union, not an independent state.26 
 After the elections, independence and separatist desires were encouraged 
throughout Georgia to stir up the movement for separation from the Soviet Union. These 
feelings were harnessed by smaller republics in Georgia who wanted to remain with 
Russia and be separated from Georgia instead, specifically South Ossetia. The 
counterpart region to South Ossetia, North Ossetia, was well within Russian territory and 
would remain part of the Russian Federation if Georgia were to gain its independence. In 
1989, as Georgian citizens were demonstrating for an independent Georgia, South 
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Ossetians began organizing against the government of Georgia to remain part of Russia.27 
This year saw the first uprising of Ossetians against the Georgian government in the post-
Soviet era, but because Georgia held onto the region as it seceded from the Soviet Union, 
it faced many more years of conflict between itself and the South Ossetians. 
 One example of this conflict occurred in June 1992. By this time Georgia had 
gained its independence from Russia and the Soviet Union itself had disbanded so that 
the Russian Federation was the major power in the region. The South Ossetians were still 
creating problems for the Georgian government in their attempts to secede from the 
country and join the republic of North Ossetia in Russia. Unlike in 1989, Russia launched 
a peacekeeping mission to South Ossetia to help stop the violence prompted by both the 
Georgian government and citizens of South Ossetia.28 This set a precedent for the 
presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Georgia, specifically in South Ossetia but 
Russian military presence has also occurred in other republics over the past twenty years. 
Because the Russian Federation is a major world power with strong dominance in the 
Caucus states, Georgia has found it difficult to dispel the Russian troops from its country. 
Later, in 1993, Russia served as a peace broker in the conflict between Georgia and South 
Ossetia, again setting a precedent for intervention and involvement in conflicts between 
Georgia and its breakaway republics.29 Russia has served as a mediator between Georgia 
and dissident parties in the country since the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
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5.3.2 Rose Revolution of 2003 
 Throughout its mediations with Georgia and its unsatisfied republics that desire 
separatism, it has been clear that Russia favors South Ossetia and supports separatist 
action in the republic. Ironically, Georgia borders Chechnya, a separatist republic in the 
Russian Federation that has been attempting to gain independence through terrorist 
attacks against the Russian government, and whom Russia has accused the Georgians of 
assisting. Tensions were especially high between Russia and Georgia over this issue 
during the first and second Chechen wars in the mid and late 1990s.30 Russia has shown 
favoritism toward the South Ossetians by allowing an accelerated passport process for 
South Ossetian citizens that undermined Georgian sovereignty and autonomy over the 
region, but holds a double standard by criticizing Georgia’s favoritism toward the 
Chechens.31 
 In 2003, Georgian citizens began their Rose Revolution, so called because it 
produced a peaceful transition between the Shevardnadze regime and new Saakashvili 
regime. The citizens demonstrated in front of the parliament building in Georgia’s 
capital, Tbilisi, using media outlets like the independent television station TV Rustavi 2 
as platforms to express their desired changes.32 Finally, the protestors broke into the 
parliament building to prevent the newly elected Shevardnadze parliament from running 
its first session.33 This caused Shevardnadze to resign and allowed Saakashvili to take 
over as president. He immediately began promoting anti-Chechen policies in an attempt 
                                                
30 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Matthew Taver-Wahlquist, “Dueling Honors: Power, Identity and the Russia-
Georgia Divide,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (2009): 309. 
31 Tsygankov and Taver-Wahlquist, “Dueling Honors,” 309. 
32 Aphrasidze and Siroky, “Frozen Transitions and Unfrozen Conflicts,” 130. 
33 Ibid. 
67 
 
to come back into good terms with Russia.34  
 Many other new leaders emerged from this revolution who were committed to 
letting go of the Soviet communist past and promoting western values. Georgia began its 
accession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2005, and 
new democratic institutions were created in Georgia.35 The government also moved to 
recognize ethnic minorities in the country and included them in the “Georgian 
nationality” as the government attempted to increase nationalism and patriotism. 
However, regional and ethnic-based parties remained banned from national elections, 
which prohibited minorities from becoming involved in the government.36 
 Relations between Russia and Georgia continued to improve under the new 
Georgian government and in May 2004 the two countries held an economic forum, the 
largest business gathering between them up to this point. With this gathering came the 
hope that the two countries could work together on the Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
conflicts.37 However, in August of that same year, Russia stopped issuing visas to 
Georgian citizens, a major step back in Russian-Georgian relations. Also in August, 
candidates in the disputed election in the republic of Abkhazia met in Moscow rather than 
Tbilisi to solve the dispute, showcasing Russia’s influence in the region and the lack of 
autonomy Georgia had over its republic.38 
 Tensions were further strained between Georgia and its republics in November 
2006 when South Ossetia held a referendum for independence and elected a new mayor 
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who supported separatism.39 In 2007, demonstrations were launched again in front of the 
Georgian parliament building as they were during the Rose Revolution in 2003.40 No 
regime change took place this time though, which only displeased those who opposed the 
Georgian government and created an even stronger desire for secession in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. The separatist movements in these republics were further inspired by 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 and its recognition as a country 
by 26 countries within a month of this declaration.41 Although Russia did not officially 
recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, it expressed its support for separatism by 
lifting sanctions placed on Georgia from the Abkhazia region soon after Kosovo’s 
declaration.42 Russia’s continued support for the separation of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia from Georgia, combined with tensions with the Georgian government, set the 
stage for both a bold attempt at secession and increased Georgian oppression in the 
region. 
 
5.3.3 The Months Preceding the Intervention 
 Although the five-day war between Georgia and its breakaway republics, in which 
Russia intervened with its military, occurred in August 2008, events that occurred in the 
months preceding the attack exhibited characteristics that pointed to Russian intervention 
being highly likely. For example, in April, Russia increased its peacekeeping presence in 
Georgia and Putin issued a decree establishing direct relations between Moscow and 
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Also during this time the conflict between Georgia and its 
republics escalated with gunfire being exchanged from both sides, as well as abductions 
and attacks on leaders taking place in the republics. 43 On July 3, artillery attacks in South 
Ossetia left twelve citizens killed or wounded.44 These attacks led South Ossetia to appeal 
to Russia for defense. In response, Russia submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC 
calling for restraint on both sides from using arms and a non-violent solution to the 
conflicts between Georgia and both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.45  
 Despite this draft resolution calling for a non-violent solution, Russia conducted 
military exercises in July by the Georgian border, including a scenario that depicted an 
invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Georgian government.46 During these 
military exercises, military aircraft flew into Georgian airspace, prompting Georgia to 
request a special meeting by the UNSC to discuss the developing conflict. Russia 
admitted to flying fighter jets over South Ossetia during this meeting, further showing its 
support for the secession of the republic.47 
 The day before the military intervention by Russia, August 7, 2008, Georgia and 
South Ossetia signed a ceasefire agreement.48 This ceasefire was immediately broken by 
forces on both sides. “On the evening of August 7, 2008, South Ossetia accused Georgia 
of launching a ‘massive’ artillery barrage against [its capital] Tskhinvali, while Georgia 
reported intense bombing of some Georgian villages in the conflict zone” says a 
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Congressional Research Service Report for the United States Congress from October 
2008.49 This breaking of the ceasefire led to a Georgian ground attack on Tskhinvali the 
next day, August 8.50 Hours later, Russian troops entered the region to support the South 
Ossetians, and Medvedev ordered air attacks on the region. The Russians justified the 
intervention with a claim that their troops were assisting elderly Russian nationals and 
children who were dying unjustly at the hands of the Georgian forces.51 
 
5.4 Analysis of Independent Internal Variables 
 In both the case of the Indian intervention into Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Russian 
intervention in Georgia, the action the intervening party was going to take was clear long 
before their militias entered the conflicts. Russia made it obvious that it was preparing to 
intervene in the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway republics with its military 
exercises that were conducted by the  Georgian border the month preceding the 
intervention. The request in July 2008 from the South Ossetians to Russia for help in 
defense against Georgian troops probably helped persuade Russia to enter the crisis. 
Although the conflict had been building in the months prior to Georgian attacks, the fact 
that the Russians sent troops in hours after the first major attack further exhibits how a 
military intervention by Russia into the conflict was imminent. Not only do preceding 
circumstances explain why India went into Sri Lanka and Russia went into Georgia in 
2008, but internal factors further point to these outcomes. 
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5.4.1 Failed State Status 
 Countries that achieve a high failed state status are usually in such a state partly 
due to the failing of the international community and therefore elicit intervention from 
the UN or another international organization. However, countries with a reasonable but 
not exceedingly high failed state status do not evoke the same feeling of responsibility in 
the international community, making it more difficult to persuade international 
organizations to use their valuable and scarce military resources on an intervention. 
Individual states who might be effected by the crisis are easier to persuade in the case of 
a “somewhat-failed” state, especially if there is a risk that the conflict could get worse 
and affect the intervening state. 
 The Failed State Index was not published by the Fund for Peace until 2005, 
followed by Foreign Policy magazine in 2007. Therefore, there are no official rankings 
for Sri Lanka in 1987. However, based on the social, economic, and political indicators 
used by these organizations to determine the modern failed state indices, it is possible to 
analyze what Sri Lanka’s failed state status would have been prior to Indian intervention 
in 1987. Based on the twelve indicators used today for determining failed state statuses, 
Sri Lanka would have received a score of 88, making its status “in danger” of becoming 
failed. 
 Social indicators include mounting demographic pressures, massive movement of 
refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), legacy of vengeance-seeking group 
grievance, and chronic and sustained human flight. Concerning demographic pressures, 
Sri Lanka in early 1987 would receive a score of 7 out of 10. As the Fund for Peace 
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website says, one form of demographic pressure in a country could be “pressures deriving 
from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, 
ownership or occupancy of land…” which would describe the Jaffna peninsula situation 
at the time. Although there was no strong indication of a refugee or IDP situation in Sri 
Lanka or India before India’s military intervention, the concerns expressed by the Indian 
government make it clear that it was likely a refugee situation was imminent. Therefore, 
the refugee and IDP indicator merits a score of 5. The group grievance indicator 
examines whether individual groups were singled out for persecution by a state. In the 
case of Sri Lanka, it is fairly obvious that the Tamils were singled out for oppression and 
exclusion by the Sinhalese as soon as Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948. 
Because this was one of the largest factors leading to the 1987 conflict, this indicator 
receives a score of 10. The human flight indicator also scores high with an 8 as 
communities of Tamils grew in the Jaffna peninsula in the north of the island where they 
could easily escape to India if necessary. This area was also under the control of the 
Tamil rebels, so exile communities of Tamils grew in this region of the country. 
 The economic indicators studied by the Fund for Peace include the presence of 
uneven economic development and sharp, severe economic decline. No economic 
difficulties were immediately obvious in connection with the 1987 conflict, so both of 
these indicators will receive a 3. The conflict was clearly based on ethnic differences 
rather than economic grievances. 
 The Fund for Peace considers six political indicators when determining a failed 
state status. These include the criminalization or delegitimization of the state, the 
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progressive deterioration of public services, violations of the application of the rule of 
law and human rights, state control of security forces, the rise of factionalized elites, and 
the intervention of other states or external political actors. In Sri Lanka, the state was 
clearly delegitimized, as it was actively fighting against its own citizens. It had lost the 
respect and confidence of its own people and had overstepped its political bounds, so this 
indicator receives a score of 10. Public services had also failed for the Tamil people at 
this point. The state was no longer working to protect all of its citizens, but instead was 
attacking those who lived in the Jaffna peninsula. The fact that the Indian government 
had to air drop food and medicinal supplies to the Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula proves 
that the Sri Lankan government was not providing these things to its citizens itself. This 
indicator receives a 9.5 because it is implied that the state was providing these services to 
its citizens throughout the rest of the country.  
No egregious human rights violations were recorded, and the Sri Lankan 
government worked with India and the rebel groups to negotiate a peaceful end to the 
fighting. The human rights indicator receives a score of 7. One definition by the Fund for 
Peace of a security apparatus that operates as a “state within a state” is the “emergence 
of… guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent 
campaigns against state security forces.” This almost epitomizes the stance of the Tamil 
rebels, especially the LTTE, and so this indicator receives a score of 10. The existence of 
factionalized elites in Sri Lanka in 1987 is not immediately obvious, but through the 
promotion of the Sinhalese people in the government, including making Sinhalese the 
official language of Sri Lanka, ethno-nationalist tendencies can be seen, so the score for 
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this indicator is an 8. Finally, the score for the external intervention indicator is 7.5 
because India was heavily involved in the conflict in Sri Lanka for many years, but did 
not launch a major military operation until late in 1987. The total score for Sri Lanka 
before the military intervention by India in August 1987 is 88, making it in danger of 
becoming failed without being critically failed. 
 In 2008, Georgia had a failed state index number of 83.8 and was considered a 
state in danger of becoming failed. Most of its indicators had scores around 5 or 6, which 
is considerably higher than stable states but not necessarily an issue of concern.52 
Georgia’s ranking increases above a borderline-failed state to a state in danger of 
becoming failed with high scores for the indicators “group grievance” (8.1), 
“delegitimization of the state” (8.4), “security apparatus” (7.7) “factionalized elites” (8.3) 
and “external intervention” (8.4). Regarding the social indicators, the group grievance 
indicator receives a high score because the Georgian government was committing 
atrocities against the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, and there was institutionalized 
political exclusion with the constitutional ban on regional and ethnic-based political 
parties. The ethnic minorities living in the breakaway republics were also singled out by 
the government and persecuted. The delegitimization of the state indicator is elevated 
because of the government’s widespread loss of popular confidence, especially in the 
breakaway regions. This was exhibited in 2003 with the Rose Revolution protests and 
again with the protests in 2007. South Ossetia’s referendum for separation further shows 
                                                
52 If all indicators were between 5 and 6, Georgia’s failed state index total would be between 60 and 72, 
making it a borderline state, the ranking given to Russia, India, Brazil, and Mexico, among other states, in 
2010. 
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a loss of confidence in the Georgian government.  
For the political indicators, the security apparatus indicator has a higher score 
because the state-sponsored Georgian military was used to attack the breakaway 
provinces. When a state military attacks its own civilians, especially after being ordered 
to do so by the government, those citizens lose the ability to call on the military for 
protection. The factors that increase the rise of factionalized elites indicator are less 
evident in Georgia than the other indicators. However, there are still indications that this 
indicator is present. Beginning with the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government 
worked to promote a Georgian nationality, and although it wanted to include all ethnic 
minorities in the country in this group, non-Georgians were de facto left out of this 
nationalistic sentiment. Because ethnic minorities were also constitutionally prohibited 
from forming political parties to compete in national elections, the Georgian-nationalistic 
sentiment that arose glorified those in power and discriminated against all other citizens. 
Finally, Georgia receives the classification of a state in danger of being failed because of 
its external intervention score. This indicator takes into account the intervention by 
Russia, though, and therefore will not be considered. 
Both Sri Lanka in 1987 and Georgia in 2008 were considered states in danger of 
becoming failed but not yet critically failed states. This difference did not indicate a 
general failing on the part of the entire international community for the failed state, but 
did place some responsibility on the regional hegemonies to keep the peace, in these 
cases India and Russia. These hegemonies were the states that launched the unilateral 
military interventions, further indicating that there is likely a correlation between the 
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failed state status of a state in conflict with the type of military intervention it elicits and 
by which external parties. 
 
5.4.2 Duration 
 The duration of fighting before intervention in Sri Lanka and the Georgian 
conflict is extremely relevant to each situation. In the previous two case studies, those of 
Yugoslavia and Darfur, years passed before the UN sent in peacekeeping forces to deal 
with the situations. In Sri Lanka and Georgia, there was no opportunity for the UN to 
spend years deliberating action, send in their fact-finding mission, and complete the rest 
of the steps necessary before deploying troops. Instead, India went into Sri Lanka four 
months after the SLA launched their attack on the Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula, and the 
Russian army was practicing scenarios that would help them respond to a Georgian attack 
on its republic at least four months before the conflict actually occurred. 
 The intertwined past of India and Sri Lanka coupled with their proximity to one 
another  ensured that India would be involved in any conflicts faced by Sri Lanka. As 
such, it included possible interventions into Sri Lanka in its military exercises in South 
India. This was necessary because Sri Lanka had faced ethnic tensions and conflict since 
its independence in 1948. Violence erupted in 1983 with the anti-Tamil riots, but 
subsided soon after with Indian encouragement for peaceful negotiations. The ethnic 
conflict faced by Sri Lanka that elicited Indian military intervention began about four 
months before in April 1987. Until then, the Tamil rebels had held the ground they had 
gained in Sri Lanka, most notably the Jaffna peninsula, and the SLA was maintaining 
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control over the rest of the island. In 1987, Sri Lanka made an attempt to reclaim the 
Jaffna peninsula, which resulted in a severe increase in fighting that India could no longer 
stay out of. It immediately involved itself in the civil war with more arbitrations. The UN 
had no chance to evaluate the situation and determine whether it should deploy its own 
peacekeeping mission. India’s military preparations made it obvious that if it needed to 
launch a military operation into Sri Lanka, it would be able to do so quickly and 
effectively. The quick turnaround from the beginning of the conflict to India’s 
involvements with arbitrations, which resulted in an agreement for the deployment of an 
Indian peacekeeping force in the peninsula, did not allow the UN to become involved. 
Especially due to the fact that it was a regional actor, it made more sense for India, who 
was already prepared, to send in its military rather than wait for the UN to make a 
decision. 
 As previously mentioned, the true beginning of the conflict between Georgia and 
its breakaway republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia began with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. However, this event created turmoil in many former Soviet republics that 
did not evolve into ethnic conflicts. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union is not the sole 
catalyst for the Georgian attacks on its republics, it cannot be considered the beginning of 
the 2008 conflict. The most obvious beginning then is April 2008, soon after Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence as a breakaway region, which incited South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to attempt their own secessions as well as encouraged Russia to grant special 
privileges to citizens of these breakaway republics as a show of support for their 
separation from Georgia. At this point, Russia had also increased its military presence in 
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the region by deploying more peacekeeping forces into Georgia and commencing 
military exercises in Russia near the Georgian border. The Georgian forces attacked the 
republics during these months and the republics launched retaliatory attacks on Georgian 
soil. It was only four months after the turmoil began that the Georgian military forces 
went into South Ossetia in an attempt to control the republic and repress the ethnic 
minorities in the region. Four hours after this major attack the Russian military intervened 
with ground and air forces. Russia was prepared to intervene and clearly wanted to send 
its military into the region to assist the breakaway republics quickly. The UN had no 
chance to begin to get involved. 
 The cases of both Sri Lanka and Georgia show that if a state is ready to intervene 
with its military in a regional ethnic conflict, it will deploy a mission before the UN has a 
chance to launch its initial fact-finding mission. The quick turnaround between the 
beginning of a conflict and military intervention by an individual state ensures that the 
UN will not be the first force to deploy peacekeeping troops. In contrast to the 
interventions in Yugoslavia and Darfur, where years went by before anyone deemed the 
conflict serious enough to intervene, Sri Lanka and Georgia only faced violence for four 
months before their regional hegemonies send military forces in to ameliorate the 
situation. A short duration of conflict, coupled by factors that make it obvious that 
violence is about to break out, are more likely to elicit individual state military 
interventions than a deployment of UN troops. 
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5.4.3 Request for External Help 
 A request for external help is crucial for an individual state to intervene 
unilaterally in an ethnic conflict. It is not beneficial for a state to spend its military 
resources on a conflict if it does not have an ally in the conflict. To send an unwelcome 
military force into a conflict will likely result in both parties to the conflict fighting 
against the new military force in an attempt to expel it from the region. Although states 
may choose to intervene with their military if they feel they can overtake the conflict and 
it is a large enough threat to their own country, a specific request from help from a party 
involved in the conflict will almost always guarantee unilateral military intervention. This 
was certainly the case with Russia intervening in Georgia.  
 There was an explicit request for help from Sri Lanka. Ultimately, the Indian 
military went into the country because of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 that had as 
a clause that India would deploy peacekeeping forces. In addition, the Tamil rebels were 
already receiving funding and supplies from India throughout the 1980s. When Sri Lanka 
requested assistance from the United States, Israel, and Pakistan, the Tamil rebels 
requested more help from India to counter these forces. India was specifically called upon 
by each party throughout the conflict to offer assistance, so it knew it would be welcome 
when it finally intervened in 1987. Unfortunately, the LTTE did not want to lose its 
power in the region with India’s intervention so it ended up fighting against the Indian 
military beginning in October 1987. Nevertheless, due to the multiple requests for help, 
the initial intervention by the IPKF was welcome by all parties. 
It is likely that Russia was supportive of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
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secessions before receiving a request for help from the breakaway republics. Russia 
opposes Georgia’s movements toward joining the western bloc, especially with its desire 
to join NATO, and will do almost anything to hinder it making such moves. There are 
also many Russian nationals living in Georgia, and because South Ossetia wanted to 
separate from Georgia with the intention of joining Russia, Russia would welcome the 
increase in territory. The request for defense from the South Ossetians was not the only 
factor that convinced Russia to intervene, but increased the likelihood that Russia would 
intervene. When Russia knew it would be welcome by the South Ossetia in the conflict, 
and therefore have an ally on the inside, it willingly sent its military in to expel the 
Georgian militia from the region. This request for help also legitimized the intervention, 
as Russia could claim it was a defensive action to protect the South Ossetians from the 
harsh military action and potential war crimes being committed by Georgia. While it was 
not necessarily essential to have a request for intervention from the South Ossetians, 
Russia was far more likely to intervene in the war for secession with this request. 
A request for military intervention into an ethnic conflict implies to the 
intervening force that it is welcome to send military troops and might even have an ally in 
the conflict to join with when it enters. In the case of India, all parties originally asked for 
Indian assistance through the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. India knew its forces would be 
welcome and did not have to worry about retaliation at first for having a military 
presence on the island. In the Georgian conflict, the South Ossetians and Abkhazians 
knew they would need the military strength their giant neighbor could provide, so they 
allied themselves with Russia and asked for troops to help fight off the Georgian army. 
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Ironically, even with an ally inside each conflict, India and Russia found themselves on 
the losing sides of the conflict. This shows that a request for help will almost certainly 
elicit intervention from an individual state, but does not guarantee continued alliance with 
the external military power nor success for the intervention. 
 
5.4.4 Major World Power Involvement 
 The world’s major powers include the permanent five (P5) and the BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) countries. These countries are constantly launching military 
interventions throughout the world to emphasize their regional hegemonies and exhibit 
their police power. Out of these countries, each P5 country possesses nuclear weapons, as 
well as India, so because of this as well as their military prowess, when a major world 
power becomes involved in an ethnic conflict, other major world powers and 
international organizations are less likely to become involved in the conflict. When India 
intervened in Sri Lanka, no other third party became involved or even seriously 
considered launching their own intervention. The conflict in Georgia was seen as a 
regional issue, so although the Russian intervention was frowned upon by the 
international community, no other country or organization launched a counter 
intervention on the side of the Georgian military forces. The intervention of a major 
world power in an ethnic conflict creates a de facto preclusion of other countries or 
organizations such as the UN from launching military interventions as well. 
 The India Doctrine in South Asia ensured that other major world powers would 
not encroach on the region of dominance claimed by India. Although Sri Lanka requested 
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assistance from the United States and other countries in its civil war, a combination of 
this doctrine as well as India’s direct involvement persuaded other nations to stay out of 
the conflict. As a major world power possessing nuclear weapons, India made it a terrible 
idea for other states to become involved in the Sri Lankan civil war. Instead, it took 
charge by launching its own military peacekeeping operation and reinforcing its 
hegemonic position in the region. With a major world power like India involving itself so 
quickly and intensely in the conflict, other states recognized the Indian sphere of 
influence and did not attempt to intervene as well. 
 Similar events unfolded in Georgia in 2008 as Russia showcased its military 
prowess over the former Soviet Republic. As another nuclear-weapon-wielding major 
power with clear influence over its former republic states, Russia played a dominant role 
in the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway republics. Although the Cold War 
ended seventeen years before Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008, no major power 
wanted to recreate the Communist-Capitalist two-world order that had existed for forty 
years, so no other major country was going to contest Russia’s intervention with their 
own military forces. After Russia took charge in its neighboring country and 
demonstrating a strong military presence, the UN and the rest of the world spoke out 
against the actions of Russia’s intervention, but no other power actually intervened, 
whether as a neutral peacekeeping party or as a force to assist the Georgian government. 
Russia’s military presence precluded military interventions from any other states or 
international organizations. 
 When a major world power involves themselves in an ethnic conflict, they are 
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precluding the involvement of any other major power or international organization, 
including the UN, European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and NATO. Whether to 
demonstrate regional strength and hegemony or maintain order in their sphere of power, 
the involvement of a major world power in an ethnic conflict determines whether any 
other states will intervene unilaterally or with an international coalition. As exhibited by 
India’s involvement in Sri Lanka, which was accompanied by a strong message for other 
countries to stay out, and by Russia’s intervention in Georgia that received attention from 
the international community but no further military action, having one major world 
power launch a military intervention into an ethnic crisis will almost guarantee that no 
other military interventions are launched for the same crisis. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 The decision for an individual state to launch a unilateral military intervention 
into an ethnic conflict is heavily dependent on the duration of the conflict and requests 
for external help from parties already involved. It is less dependent on but still influenced 
by how failed the state in turmoil is and whether other major world powers are already 
involved in a conflict. The interventions by both India and Russia both occurred 
approximately four months after the major conflicts in Sri Lanka and Georgia began. This 
provided enough time to prepare their own military forces and analyze the situation but 
not enough time for other states or international organizations to decide to intervene 
militarily. Because India and Russia were regional hegemonies to the conflict, they had a 
better sense of the turmoil and how to deal with each party involved quicker than the rest 
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of the international community. The requests for military intervention, mainly from the 
rebel groups fighting against the state governments, but also eventually from Sri Lanka’s 
government with the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, was perhaps the deciding factor that 
caused a unilateral military intervention to occur rather than an intervention by an 
international organization or coalition of forces. By explicitly asking an individual state 
for assistance, especially major world powers like India and Russia, responsibility of the 
conflict is partially placed on this third party. If the state to which help was requested 
opted not to act, but instead to try and remain distanced from the conflict, it would be 
easier to place blame for atrocities on this state. This idea is supported by the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which falls just short of requiring able states to 
prevent atrocities committed by government forces against its own citizens.  
 States that elicit unilateral as opposed to collective military intervention in their 
ethnic conflicts are often states in danger of becoming failed rather than being critically 
failed. This provides some hope for the international community that they will be able to 
pull out of their ethnic conflict and create peace on their own. The stakes are much higher 
for an individual regional actor with fears of spillage and refugee problems. Therefore, 
while it is not the determining factor for which type of intervention is elicited, the failed 
state status has a large impact on whether the international community will take 
collective action or if an individual state has to make the intervention decision on its own. 
 Unilateral interventions are different from UN-led interventions in ethnic conflicts 
because they take less time to prepare for and execute, and are often done at the request 
of one of the fighting parties in the conflict. Neutrality is not required of the forces as it is 
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with the UN. Whenever a regional issue arises, the hegemonic state usually sends in its 
military before any other states or organizations if it fears spillage of the conflict or the 
potential development of a refugee situation. Due to these differences, it is possible to 
determine when a new conflict will elicit a unilateral military intervention from an 
individual state versus a UN-led intervention from international forces. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 As determined in the previous chapters, internal factors in ethnic crises 
significantly contribute to whether the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will 
authorize an intervention or a unilateral military force will intervene. The UNSC is more 
likely to send in peacekeeping forces when the state in ethnic crisis is failed, and when 
the conflict has endured for years. When a state is considered critically failed, the 
responsibility for this failing falls partly on the international community, which is 
embodied in the United Nations (UN). In today’s globalized world, each country has a 
responsibility to help neighboring and regional countries ensure they are meeting 
international standards on human rights practices and standards of living, especially in 
developing nations. Hegemonic states and organizations usually take it upon themselves 
to oversee the stability in their regions, but ultimately the entire international community 
must work together to support each other. This support was exhibited in 2010 during the 
European Union (EU) economic crisis involving Greece, Ireland, Romania, and Portugal, 
when the World Bank and International Monetary Fund provided money to the EU to 
prevent bankruptcy and severe devaluation of the Euro. The UNSC will deploy a 
peacekeeping force or authorize a military intervention into ethnic crises in failed states 
because it is believed to be, in part, the fault of the UN that the state is failed and has 
lapsed into crisis. 
 The UNSC is also most likely to intervene in a conflict that has persisted for a 
long time, usually years. Because of their democratic nature, limited resources, and 
significant levels of bureaucracy necessary to make an intervention decision, a new 
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conflict will rarely see UN military intervention. A conflict that elicits an intervention 
within a year of beginning or escalation usually faces a unilateral intervention, as 
individual states and regional organizations often have more resources on-hand for 
military interventions more quickly and are able to make decisions regarding 
interventions quicker than the UN. However, conflicts that have not yet been addressed 
unilaterally and have been enduring long enough for the UN to finally make a decision as 
to what to do will, generally, elicit a military response from the UN in the form of 
peacekeeping forces. Therefore, the longer an ethnic conflict persists, the more likely the 
UNSC will decide to intervene militarily. 
 States will most likely consider a unilateral intervention if there is a request for 
help from one of the parties already involved in the ethnic conflict. If the government of 
an ally is attempting to quell an uprising and needs backup forces, a third government or 
organization is far more likely to intervene militarily in the situation to assist their ally 
than a non-associated third party or the UN. If an oppressed people who are being 
persecuted in an ethnic crisis send out a call for help, the potential intervening party will 
consider whether they have similar ideology and values, as well as consider the ideology 
of the sovereign government. A request for help from inside the conflict will definitely 
serve to get the attention of a potential intervening state or organization, but other 
intervening variables that are specific to each party considering launching a military 
intervention will contribute to the final decision. 
 Finally, if there is already a major power involved as one of the parties in the 
crisis, no one else will usually intervene. If the UNSC attempts to pass a resolution 
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demanding action or mandating a peacekeeping forces, it will likely be vetoed. If another 
state attempts to intervene with their military against the major power, they could risk 
certain defeat or the loss of a powerful political ally. This risk deters most states from 
intervening in ethnic conflicts when a major power is already present. 
 The external factors that were analyzed in the literature review are not 
unimportant when considering military interventions into ethnic conflicts, but they are 
intervening variables rather than independent variables. The internal factors, which are 
the independent variables, determine whether a state or organization will take up the 
question of military intervention. If the right internal factors are not present, the 
intervention won’t even be considered. However, if the necessary internal factors are 
present in an ethnic conflict, the correct external factors must then be present as well. The 
external factors can confirm or hinder a positive military intervention decision, and can 
also determine how great or small the military response is by the third party. External 
factors are not completely irrelevant, but internal factors are notably still the initially 
significant factors when deciding on military interventions. 
 By studying the previous four case studies and analyzing the effects of internal 
factors on military intervention decisions in ethnic crises, a clear pattern has been 
established as to when ethnic crises will elicit different types of military intervention by 
third parties. These patterns can now be applied to current ongoing ethnic crises, as well 
as any developing or future conflicts that arise, to determine what type of military 
intervention is likely. For example, if India, which is currently a “borderline” failed 
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state1, were to become a critically failed state, the UNSC would likely decide to intervene 
in the Kashmiri situation. Pakistan is currently a “critically” failed state2, so under these 
hypothetical circumstances the ethnic conflict would be occurring within two failed 
states. It has been ongoing for many years already. Therefore, the Kashmiri conflict 
would fit the conditions for a UNSC authorized military intervention. Although India is 
considered a major power, it is not a permanent five (P5) country, and as such would not 
have the power to veto resolutions passed by the UNSC authorizing an intervention. 
Other similar analyses to this one can be made as new ethnic crises occur using the 
patterns analyzed and developed throughout this paper. 
 While only four major internal factors were analyzed, there are many more that 
impact decisions regarding military interventions into ethnic crises. To more fully 
develop intervention patterns, other factors prevalent in these decisions should be 
determined, as well as how strong of an impact they have on UN or unilateral 
interventions. The analysis laid out throughout this paper is meant establish a baseline for 
further evaluation of military interventions into ethnic crises, and it has not exhausted all 
possible factors that are present when these decisions are made. 
  
                                                
1 According to the 2010 Failed State Index published by Foreign Policy 
2 Also according to Foreign Policy’s 2010 Failed State Index 
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